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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
With inflation increasing to about 9 percent in the second half of 
1978, the Carter administration announced on October 24, 1978, 1 the 
beginning of what was to become a t~-year progran of "voluntary" pay-
price guidelines aimed at lowering the inflation rate. Despite the 
guidelines, the innation rate accelerated to 11.3 percent in 1979, up 
from 7.7 percent for 1978. 
Innation worsened further in 1980, averaging 13.5 percent. Thus, 
during the two years of the program the inflation rate actually 
increased. However, the program cannot necessarily be called ineffec-
tive simply because the inflation rate increased. The possibility 
exists that the inflation rate, in the absence of the program, could 
have been even higher. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine if the Carter program 
was effective in combating wage and price inflation. Traditionally, 
the effectiveness of incomes policies has been estimated by a test of 
the statistical significance of an intercept dummy variable. This 
method suffers from the requirement that the policy only shifts the 
intercept, and ignores other ways in which the policy might affect the 
structure of a wage or price inflation model, Some of these other 
1 
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possibilities, which policymakers often proclaim in support of incomes 
policies, include (but are not limited to) bringing wage inflation into 
line with trend productivity growth, changing the short-run inflation-
unemployment tradeoff, reducing inflationary expectations, and insulat-
ing the economy from price shocks. 
In this study, each of the above justifications will be converted 
into testable hypotheses. The model estimated here differs from the 
models that have typically been used to test for the effects of incomes 
policies. Previous studies have generally incorporated price inflation 
expectations into their wage equations by assuming that the expected 
price level is a weighted average of past price levels. This 
formulation, known as adaptive expectations, has been criticized for 
ignoring information that may be relevant. The model used here 
overcomes this criticism by relying on the theory of rational 
expectations; i.e., expectations based on the efficient use of all 
available, relevant information. Thus, in this study, price inflation 
expectations will be estimated, and these expectations will then be 
incorporated into the wage inflation equation. Dummy variables 
representing the incomes policies (or their phases) will be interacted 
with the relevant explanatory variable which depends upon the 
hypothesis being tested. The estimated coefficients of these 
interacted variables in the wage inflation equation will provide 
evidence relating to the effectiveness of the various incomes policies. 
Plan of the Study 
Chapter II will have three main sections, beginning with a 
discussion of the details of the Carter pay and price guidelines, 
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including some of the loopholes. This section will be followed by a 
section on the approaches that have previously been used to measure the 
effects of the program. A summary of the results of these previous 
empirical studies will also be included in this section. The final 
section will be a discussion of the shortcomings of the previous 
empirical studies. The third chapter will include a discussion of the 
models to be used in examining the effects of the Carter program, 
including a discussion of the incorporation of the theory of rational 
expectations (as opposed to the use of adaptive expectations) into 
models designed to measure the effectiveness of incomes policies, and 
the results derived from these models. The fourth chapter will examine 
the effects of the Carter program on wage inflation in fifteen SIC 2-
digit manufacturing industries. The fifth and final chapter will be 
the conclusions and recommendations. 
ENDNOTES 
1The guidelines were announced in preliminary form at this time; 
final standards were published in the Federal Register on December 28, 
1978. These standards were not truly final, however, as the program 
was amended several times during its two-year existence. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CARTER PAY AND PRICE STANDARDS 
Introduction 
During the last twenty-five years, the United States has experi-
mented with incomes policies during three separate periods. The first 
of these three policies began in 1962 during the Kennedy Administration 
and lasted almost six years. The second of these three policies was 
the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization Program. It was the 
only postwar period of mandatory wage and price controls in the United 
States, and lasted from August 15, 1971 through April 30, 1974, 
although the second half (starting .January 11 , 1973) was a period of 
decontrol. The third of these policies was the Carter Administration's 
Pay and Price Standards Program, which lasted approximately two years, 
although the second year's standards were more relaxed than the first. 
The dramatic increase in the inflation rate early in 1978 
initially caused the Carter administration to increase efforts to 
persuade business and labor to moderate price and wage increases. As 
the public urgently demanded that the government "do something" to 
check inflation, the Carter administration asked companies to slow 
their 1978 price increases relative to the prior year, and major unions 
were asked to bring their settlements in line with the economy-wide 
average rate of wage increase. These efforts at "jawboning" were 
barely under way before it was decided that these measures were not 
5 
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strong enough. With the 197R Congressional elections just several 
weeks away, Presi~ent Carter announced on October 24, 1978, economy-
wide standards for wage and price increases. 
The Carter Program 
The primary authority for the design and implementation of the 
standards was delegated to the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(Co.iPS). 1 OOWPS was created by Congress in 1974 as an agency within. 
the Executive Office of the President. The President was given the 
authority to appoint the eight members and four adviser-members to the 
Council, and to designate the Chairman of the Council. At the time of 
its creation, COWPS was charged with the monitoring of wage and price 
changes throughout the economy and with determining the extent to which 
the activities of the federal government were contributing to 
inflation. COWPS' function was greatly expanded in 1978 when the 
agency became responsible for administering the Carter pay and price 
2 
standards. COWPS apparently believed that the success of the program 
hinged on the pay side, as it was thought that competitive market 
conditions would assure that any labor-cost savings would result in 
smaller price increases. 
The Pay Standard 
During the first year of the program, the pay standard provided 
that average increases in hourly compensation (wage rates plus hourly 
private fringe-benefit costs) not exceed 7 percent for each employer 
group. The groups were defined as (1) employees covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, (2) other nonmanagerial personnel, and (3) 
7 
managerial personnel.3 There were various exceptions to this rule. 
For example, workers earning less than $4.00 per hour on October 1, 
1978, were exempted from the pay standard, as were labor compensation 
increases mandated by federal statutes. In addition, an exception was 
created so that employers could raise wages above the standard if such 
wage increases were necessary to overcome an "acute labor shortage." 
The pay standard did not apply to contractual agreements which were in 
existence before the announcement of the program. 
The pay program contained several loopholes, one of the most 
important of which turned out to favor union workers who had a cost-of-
living adjustment (COLA) in their contract. Under COWPS' rules, the 
monetary equivalent of an expected COLA payment was computed for 
purposes of determining compliance on the assumption that the annual 
rate of inflation during the life of the contract would be 6 percent. 
Thus, COWPS considered a contract with a 7 percent pay increase and no 
COLA to be the equivalent of a contract with a 3.4 percent pay increase 
plus a COLA adjusting for 60 percent of inflation. If the rate of 
inflation turned out to be 12 percent (which it approximately was), 
however, the contract with a COLA would result in a 10.6 percent pay 
increase, and would be in compliance. At the same time, a contract 
without a COLA would be stuck at a 7 percent pay increase. During the 
second year of the program, the inflation assumption for evaluating 
COLA clauses was increased to 7.5 percent. Over roughly the same time 
period, however, the CPI increased 12.9 percent. With this loophole, 
COLA workers had an average pay increase of 10.~ percent during the 
first year and 11.1 percent during the second year, while non-COLA 
workers averaged 6.5 percent and R.8 percent for the same time 
. d 4 per1o s. In an attempt to alleviate the problem, COWPS announced on 
October 2, 1979, that employee units that had complied with the first-
year pay standard and had not received cost-of-living adjustments were 
eligible for an additional 1 percent increase in pay. In addition, 
COWPS encouraged companies to use a gross-inequity exception clause to 
request larger pay increases if required to remedy interfirm or intra-
firm inequities caused by the guidelines regarding COLA payments. 
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On March 31, 1980, a new pay standard range of 7.5 percent to 9.5 
percent was announced and was made retroactive to October 1, 1979. 5 In 
effect, 9.5 percent became the second-year pay limitation because there 
was no criteria announced for limiting pay increases below 9.5 percent. 
The Price Standard 
Tne price standard was designed to be consistent with the pay 
standard. The initial price standard was derived by adding to the 7 
percent pay standard one-half of a percentage point because of 
relatively large increases in employment taxes and subtracting one and 
three-quarters percentage points for trend productivity growth. 
Assuming that prices are a constant percentage mark-up over unit labor 
costs, COWPS set the aggregate price standard at 5.75 percent. This 
aggregate price standard was 0.5 percentage points less than the 
estimated inflation rate (during the 1975:4 to 1977:4 base period) in 
the sector of the economy which was covered by the price standard 
(which did not cover food prices at the farm, mortgage interest rates, 
crude oil prices, and exports among other things). COWPS set a 
company-specific price deceleration standard which required firms to 
limit price increases to 0.5 percentage points less than the base-
period rate of change. Any increase below 1.5 percent was automati-
cally considered to be in compliance and any increase exceeding 9.5 
percent was considered not to be in compliance. In addition, for any 
company which experienced a pay deceleration greater than 0.5 percent-
age points, full pass-through of the additional pay deceleration was 
required for compliance. In such cases, the total price deceleration 
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percentage was 0.5 percentage points plus the product of the rate of 
pay deceleration that was in excess of 0.5 percentage points multiplied 
by the ratio of employment costs in the base quarter to total revenue 
in the base quarter. An alternative profit-margin standard was 
designed for firms who either had uncontrollable increases in costs or 
who could not compute a meaningful average price change. This alterna-
tive standard consisted of two parts. First, a company's profit 
margin6 for the program year was limited to no more than the 
average profit margin in the best two of the company's previous three 
fiscal years. Second, the company's increase in its dollar profit was 
limited to 6.5 percent plus the percentage increase in unit sales 
volume. 
Alternative standards and rules were created for industries where 
there were highly volatile raw materials prices (such as in petroleum 
refining or food processing), ~1ere institutional characteristics made 
application of the price standard inappropriate (such as in insurance 
or banking), or where there were difficulties in carrying out the 
required computations (such as in wholesale or retail trade). In these 
cases, standards were developed that generally limited the percentage 
or dollar gross margin (roughly defined as revenues minus the cost of 
intermediate products) that a company could earn. 
10 
On October 2, 1979, COWPS published its proposed second-year 
price standards. The price limitation was increased by one percentage 
point to 6.75 percent to reflect the one percentage point non-COLA 
catch-up allowance on the pay side. The profit limitation was 
retained, but was made more restrictive (by 50 percent) to reduce the 
amount of catch-up that had been possible where a company's profit 
margin in the base-year was not as great as in the best two out of 
three previous fiscal years. No significant changes were made in the 
special-sector standards. 
While the government called the guidelines voluntary, it also 
announced its intention to punish those who failed to comply. 
Specifically, the government threatened to punish violators by with-
holding federal contracts, exerting federal regulatory powers more 
strenuously, and publishing an "enemies list" of noncompliers. The 
government never used the sanction of barring noncomplying firms from 
government contracts, however, and by the fall of 1979, COWPS had only 
two firms on its public list of definite noncompliers with the price 
guidelines. While a m.lllber of firms did comply with the price guide-
lines, many did not. For those who did not comply, the general 
sequence of events went like this: COWPS would publicly accuse a 
company of noncompliance, then the company would deny noncompliance and 
seek reconsideration and permission to switch to the more lenient 
profit-margin standard, and after several weeks of inquiries and 
negotiations, COWPS would grant an exception. By COWPS' own estimate, 
only one-third of the firms monitored were under the basic price 
limitations; the rest were "complying" with the alternative profit 
limitation or the gross-margin standards. 
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Given the standards' loopholes, the lack of enforcement of the 
guidelines, the "guidelines math" which resulted in almost every major 
labor contract being in compliance regardless of the size of the wage 
increase granted, and COWPS' granting of exceptions to the price guide-
lines to almost every company that applied for one, is it possible that 
this "voluntary" program filled with loopholes and exceptions and 
little if any enforcement was responsible for reducing the rate of 
inflation? 
Previous Assessments of the Carter Standards 
Several empirical studies have been performed to determine the 
effects of the Carter program on wage and price inflation. Generally, 
these studies have been based on the notion that expectations of 
inflation are formed adaptively; that is, people base their 
expectations for next period's inflation rate on an average of actual 
inflation rates during previous periods, with the most recent periods 
weighted the most heavily. The empirical evidence on the effects of 
the Carter standards is mixed. 
A Simplified Wage Price Model 
Most of the empirical studies have relied upon a two-equation 
model to measure the effects of an incomes policy on wage and price 
inflation7• A simplified model of the wage-price process is as 
follows: 
(2. 1) 
(2.2) 
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Equation (2.1) says that the pe~centage ~ate of cnange in hourly 
labor compensation, W, is a linear function of a distributed lag on 
past percentage rates of change of consumer prices, L(P), and the 
difference between the actual, U, and natural rates of unemployment, U. 
The distributed lag on past inflation rates is usually inter-
preted as a reflection of adaptive expectations of future inflation 
rates. In the absence of money illusion, the coefficient a1 would 
be equal to 1.0 since L(P) is defined as being equal to 
The difference between the actual and natural unemployment rates 
is a measure of labor-market disequilibrium. This measure incorporates 
into the model the intertemporal shift of the short-run Phillips curve 
which is primarily attributable to demographic changes in the labor 
force, which until recently have raised the natural unemployment rate. 
The coefficient, a2, is interpreted as the slope of the short-run 
Phillips curve. 
If a1 = 1, and U = U, then a0 , the constant term, can be 
interpreted as equilibrium real wage growth. If factor shares are 
constant, the equilibrium wage growth is equal to the trend growth of 
labor productivity. 
The above wage equation is less than fully specified; a fully 
specified equation would include a number of other variables, including 
such things as changes in employment taxes and in the minimum wage. 
Equation (2.2) states that the percentage rate of increase of 
prices is a function of the growth of unit labor costs at trend 
productivity growth, R, and the percentage rate of change of exogenous 
13 
materials prices, E. In recent years, changes in oil prices, crude 
materials prices, and farm prices have been potential candidates for 
the variable E. 
In equation (2.2), capital costs are omitted; capital costs have 
rarely had much explanatory power, presumably because of difficulty in 
measuring them. In this formulation, the estimated values of b1 and b2 
should approximately equal the shares of labor and materials in total 
cost divided by the complement of capital's share. If factor shares 
are constant, b0 should be approximately zero. 
To test for the effectiveness of an incomes policy in slowing 
inflation, researchers have used two methods. The first one involves 
the use of dummy variables. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) would be 
rewritten as: 
(2.j) 
(2 .4) 
In equations (2.3) and (2.4), the new variable Z represents the dummy 
variable and may take on a value of 1 for each period the incomes 
policy is in effect, and a value of 0 for each period the incomes 
policy is not in effect. At times, it may be appropriate to assign Z a 
value between 0 and 1 to reflect the anticipation of an incomes policy 
beginning or ending or to reflect the "enforcement" of the policy. The 
estimated value of a3 and b3 can be interpreted as the direct effects 
of an incomes policy on the rates of wage and price inflation, 
respectively. If either a3 or b3 were positive, or if a3 or b3 were 
not statistically different from 0, this would be evidence that the 
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policy was ineffective. On the other hand, a negative value for either 
a3 or b3 would be evidence that the policy was effective. 
The second method involves the use of a simulation. This method 
of testing the effectiveness of an incomes policy requires an 
estimation of the coefficients in equations (2.1) and (2.2) using data 
from the period prior to the announcement of the policy. The estimated 
equations are then used to project or simulate the behavior of wages 
and prices during the period following the implementation of the 
incomes policy. If this forecast predicts wage and price increases 
which were greater than the actual increases, this would be evidence 
that the incomes policy had an effect in holding down wage and price 
inflation. On the other hand, if the predicted values are close to or 
less than the actual values, this would provide evidence that the 
policy was ineffective in slowing wage and price inflation. 
The major shortcoming of both methods is that neither one can 
discriminate between the effects of an incomes policy and any other 
shooks that are not fully represented by the explanatory variables that 
appear in equations (2.1) and (2.2). Thus, the evidence that is 
provided by these methods for or against the effectiveness of an 
incomes policy cannot be viewed as conclusive. It is always possible 
that something other than the incomes policy itself caused wages and 
prices to diverge from their long-term trend. Thus, the debate over 
the effectiveness of an incomes policy should hinge on the evidence 
derived from a wide variety of reasonable, theoretical specifications 
of the wage and price equations. 
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Previous Empirical Studies 
The empirical studies dealing with the effects of the Carter 
program can be divided into two groups, the early studies that did not 
include the poststandards period and the later studies that did include 
this period. 
One important problem exists in the early studies; none of them 
consider the problem of postprogram catch-up effects. For example, 
Alan Blinder has shown that after the period of Nixon contro1s, the 
price level returned to the level it would have achieved without 
controls approximately four months after the controls were removed. 
Blinder estimated that ten months after the program had ended, the 
price level was 0.9 percentage pOints higher than it would have been 
had the program never existed. 8 
A study by Lloyd Ulman and Robert Flanagan of the effectiveness 
of incomes policies in Europe lends additional support to the idea that 
the postcontrols period should be taken into account. These authors 
document a number of cases ~1ere postcontrols catch-up has overwhelmed 
the favorable effects generated during the controls period. 9 
This postprogram catch-up phenomenon has important implications 
for an evaluation of the Carter program, and the early studies must be 
examined With the view that they may be incomplete. With this in mind, 
we can now look at how COWPS, in an early study, evaluated the effec-
tiveness of its own program. 
The COWPS Study. One of the first studies on the effectiveness 
of the program was done by COWPS. 1° For the period from 1978:4 through 
1980:3, COWPS estimated both the direct effects and the full effects 
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(allowing for the interaction between wage and price increases) of the 
standards, using both the simulation approach and the dummy variable 
approach. For the period under study, COWPS, using their preferred 
equations, found about a 1 percentage point reduction in pay inflation 
using the dummy variable and simulation approaches for the direct 
effects. Using the dummy variable approach to measure the direct 
effects, COWPS found that the standards did not affect price inflation. 
When the simulation approach was used to determine the direct effects 
of the standards on price inflation, COWPS found that the standards 
caused a 0.8 percentage point reduetion in the CPI. 
In order to assess the robustness of the estimated effects of the 
standards, COWPS re-estimated the direct effects, using the dummy 
variable approach, for alternative specifications of the pay and price 
equations. Several variations in the initial specification of the 
independent variables in the pay equation caused a substantial range to 
develop in the estimates of the reduction in wage inflation attribut-
able to the standards. The range was from a 1.664 percentage point 
reduction to a 0.319 percentage point reduction in wage inflation, with 
some estimates not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Variations in the initial specification of the price equation 
supported the conclusion that the price standard had little or no 
direct effect on price inflation. The only effect of the program was 
indirect, through the lowering of wage inflation. 
Using the simulation approach to measure the full effects of the 
standards, COWPS found a 1.2 percentage point reduction in wage 
inflation and a 1.5 percentage point reduction in price inflation over 
this period. COWPS concluded that this result was due to two factors: 
17 
first, the price simulation equation generated an average direct effect 
of a 0.8 percentage point reduction in price inflation, and secondly, 
the larger effect of the pay standard is reflected in lower rates of 
price inflation (through reduced labor-cost inflation) more quickly 
than the effect of the price standard is reflected in lower rates of 
wage inflation (through reduced inflationary expectations of workers). 
The GAO Study. The COWPS study demonstrated that the findings on 
program effectiveness are highly sensitive to the specification of the 
equations. A separate early study (1980) by the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) further demonstrated the importance of accounting for the 
sensitivity of econometric results to variations in the specifications 
of the equations. 11 GAO used a preliminary COWPS estimate of a 1.58 
percentage point reduction in wage inflation12 due to the standards 
(using tne dummy variable approach) as their benchmark, and substituted 
several alternative variables into the COWPS pay equation in place of 
some of the explanatory variables COWPS was using. When GAO substi-
tuted the personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCE) for the 
CPI, the standards coefficient was nearly cut in half, from -1.58 to 
-0.92. FUrther substitution of the nonfarm business deflator for the 
PCE reduced the standards coefficient by another two-thirds, from -0.92 
to -0.31 and caused the standards variable to lose its statistical 
significance. 13 GAO also claimed that similar results were obtained 
when they used a simulation to estimate the effect of the pay standard. 
Using the dummy variable approach for the 1967:2 to 1980:1 time 
period, GAO estimated that the guidelines increased the CPI rate of 
price inflation by an average of 2.07 percentage points from 1978:4 to 
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1980:1. This unexplained acceleration also occurred when GAO estimated 
the price equation for the period prior to the standards and forecast 
inflation for the period from 1978:4 to 1980:1. In this case, the 
predicted rate of increase in the CPI fell short of the actual rate of 
increase in each quarter by an average of 1.8 percentage points. 
The Frye and Gordon Study. Further support for the proposition 
that the Carter price standards had no effect on price inflation was 
found by Jon Frye and Robert J. Gordon. 14 Using a reduced-form price 
equation, Frye and Gordon introduced dummy variables for the periods 
1978:4 to 1979:4 and 1980:1 to 1980:2 and concluded that both variables 
were insignificantly different from zero. Frye and Gordon did not 
estimate a wage equation in their study. 
The Meyer Study. There have been two important studies of the 
Carter pay and price guidelines which have included an analysis of the 
postcontrols period; one study was done by Jack Meyer, 15 the other was 
by John B. Hagens and R. Robert Russe11. 16 Meyer begins his analysis 
by estimating wage equations similar to those used by both COWPS and 
GAO through the time period covered by their analysis. 17 Next, Meyer 
uses the same equations with the time period extended through 1981:3. 
This added one year to the COWPS sample period and one and a half years 
to the GAO sample period. Meyer's results show that the standards 
variable in the equation corresponding closely to COWPS' preferred wage 
equation drops to half its former size (from -0.29 to -0.14) and loses 
its statistical significance when the 1980:~ through 1981:3 time period 
is included. 
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Meyer then re-estimates the GAO preferred equation, which used 
the PCE instead of the CPI as a measure of price changes. In this 
equation, the standards impact was not significant initially. When the 
longer time frame is used, the coefficient goes from negative and 
significantly statistically insignificant to positive and statistically 
insignificant. 
Finally, Meyer tests the sensitivity of tne results for the 
longer time period by using the hourly earnings index in place of a pay 
measure including fringe benefits as the dependent variable in COWPS' 
pay equation. The results were substantially the same as in the 
regular equation, with only a slight variation in the size of the 
standards variable, which remained statistically insignificant. 18 
The Hagens and Russell Stud¥· The most sophisticated previous 
study of the Carter program was done by Hagens and Russell. With 
regard to wage inflation, Hagens and Russell tested four separate 
hypotheses: (1) Did the standards bring wage demands into line with 
productivity growth? (2) Did the standards change the inflation-
unemployment tradeoff? (3) Did the standards deflate inflationary 
expectations? (4) Did the standards insulate the economy from the oil-
price shocks of 1979 and 1980? We will now examine these four 
questions in turn. 
In their study of the Carter program, Hagens and Russell argue 
that the standard wage equations generally used in incomes policy 
research are misspecified. Specifically, they argue that in the wage 
equation in a wage-price model with no money illusion, the constant 
term should be equal to the trend rate of growth of labor productivity. 
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Trend productivity growth, however, has not been constant in the lmited 
States, leading Hagens and Russell to replace the constant with a 
trend-productivity variable. They then test for the effect of the 
Carter standards in bringing wage demands into line with trend-produc-
tivity growth by including in the wage equation two dummy variables 
that interact with the trend-productivity variable, with each dummy 
variable representing a distinctive phase of the program. 19 Hagens and 
Russell estimated that the Carter standards reduced wage inflation by 
1.2 percentage points in the first year and by 1 percentage point in 
the second year of the program.20 
When Hagens and Russell tested the hypothesis that the Carter 
program changed the slope of the short-run Phillips curve, they 
interacted the standards dummy variables (one for each of the two years 
of the Carter program) with the difference between the unemployment 
rate and the natural unemployment rate. Hagens and Russell concluded 
the standards did not affect the short-run inflation unemployment 
trade-off. 
For the hypothesis that the standards program retarded 
inflationary expectations, Hagens and Russell interacted the standards 
dummy variables with a 12 quarter polynomial distributed lag on past 
percentage rates of change of consumer prices. They found that 
inflationary expectations were lowered by 17 percent in the first year 
and 11 percent in the second year. Hagens and Russell argued that L(P) 
over the relevant periods averaged 7.4 percent and 9.7 percent, 
respectively. This estimate translated to direct effects on wage 
inflation of 1.3 percentage points (-.17 x 7.4) and 1.1 percentage 
points (-.11 x 9.7) during the two phases. 21 
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Hagens and Russell also examined the hypothesis that the standards 
program was successful in preventing the energy price explosion of 
1979-80 from getting built into wage demands. Specifically, they 
tested whether or not workers took into account price increases 
directly attributable to the energy price explosion in formulating 
their wage demands. Their findings indicate that most of the effects 
of the energy price explosion were not passed through in the form of 
higher wage demands. 
Hagens and Russell also tested the direct effects of the Carter 
program on price inflation. Unfortunately, they did not report their 
results; however, they did report that their tests decisively rejected 
the hypothesis that the standards had any direct effects on price 
inflation. They argued, however, that if the standards affected wages 
directly, then the standards could have lowered price inflation 
indirectly through the pass-through of lower labor-cost inflation to 
prices. 
In addition, Hagens and Russell estimated both the direct effect 
of the Carter program on wage inflation through simulation of the wage 
equation and the full effect of the program by taking into account the 
interaction between prices and wages through joint simulation of the 
wage and price equations. The simulations were done for both the 
standards period (1978:4 to 1980:4) and the standards and poststandards 
periods (1978:4 to 1983:2). In the simulations, it was assumed that 
the absorption of the energy price increases was attributable to the 
program rather than to some other structural change; this assumption is 
reflected in the wage equation through the inclusion of an energy price 
explosion variable. Hagens and Russell found that during the standards 
22 
period, wage inflation was directly reduced by an average of 1.35 
percentage points; for the standards and poststandards period, the 
reduction averaged 1.21 percentage points. This persistence of the 
reduction in wage inflation after the standards ended was attributed to 
the maintained hypothesis that workers were persuaded to absorb the 
energy price increases for all time, and to the fact that one of the 
explanatory variables in the wage equation is a twelve quarter lag on 
prices, with coefficients remaining significant all the way to the end 
of the lag. 
The joint simulation of the wage and price equations shows that 
wage inflation was reduced by an average of 1.54 percentage points 
during the standards period, and by an average of 1.93 percentage 
points during the standards and poststandards period. Price inflation 
was reduced by an average of 0.79 percentage points during the 
standards period, and by an average of 1.27 percentage points during 
the standards and poststandards period. From early 1980 until early 
1983, however, price inflation was reduced by an amount substantially 
greater than 1 percentage point, sometimes approaching 2 percentage 
points. 
In summation, Hagens and Russell argued that the Carter standards 
(1) brought wage demands into line with trend productivity growth, (2) 
did not change the slope of the short-run Phillips curve, (3) retarded 
inflation expectations and thus directly lowered wage inflation, (4) 
prevented the energy price explosion of 1979-80 from getting built into 
wage demands, and (5) did not have any direct effects on price 
inflation. Hagens and Russell argued, however, that when the inter-
action between prices and wages was accounted for by a joint simulation 
of the price and wage equations, the results indicated that the 
standards reduced price inflation, apparently due to the pass-through 
of lower labor-cost inflation to prices. 
Reassessing the Effectiveness of the Carter Standards 
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The Hagens and Russell study is the most recent and sophisticated 
of the various studies of the effects of the Carter program on pay and 
prices. Tnis study, however, has three major shortcomings. The first 
shortcoming revolves around Hagens and Russell's assumption that 
expectations are adaptive. They may, however, be rational which 
implies that the relevant equations should be estimated using a 
rational expectations approach. Tne second shortcoming is a failure to 
interact dummy variables representing the Kennedy-Johnson guidelines 
and Nixon controls periods with variables that were interacted with 
the Carter standards dummy variables. In their test of whether the 
Carter standards brought wage demands into line with productivity 
growth, Hagens and Russell criticized earlier studies dealing with the 
Kennedy-Johnson guidelines and the Nixon controls periods for failing 
to use a trend-productivity variable in place of the constant term in 
the wage equation. As noted earlier, they argued that the appropriate 
way to test for the effect of an incomes policy in bringing wage 
demands into line with productivity growth is by including a dummy 
variable that represents the incomes policy, and interacting that 
dummy variable with the trend-productivity variable. In their wage 
equation Hagens and Russell include a dummy variable representing the 
Carter standards, and interact that dummy variable with the trend-
productivity variable. Since they have included dummy variables 
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representing both the Kennedy-Johnson guidelines and the Nixon controls 
in their wage equation, however, a more appropriate specification of 
the wage equation would be one where these dummy variables are allowed 
to interact with the trend-productivity variable. Similarly, when 
Hagens and Russell tested the hypotheses that the Carter program 
changed the slope of the short-run Phillips curve and that the 
standards program retarded inflationary expectations, they again 
incorporated interactive dummy variables only for the period of the 
Carter program. For the hypothesis concerning the slope of the short-
run Phillips curve, Hagens and Russell interacted the standards dummy 
variables (one for each of the two years of the Carter program) with 
the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural unemploy-
ment rate. For the hypothesis concerning the retardation of 
inflationary expectations, the standards dummy variables are interacted 
with a 12 quarter polynomial distributed lag on past percentage rates 
of change of consumer prices. A more appropriate specification in each 
case would seem to be one that applied the interaction terms to the 
earlier periods as well. The third shortcoming is an apparent specifi-
cation error of the equation used to test for the effectiveness of the 
Carter standards in preventing the energy price shock of 1979-BO from 
being passed through to wage inflation. We will deal with the first 
two shortcomings in the next chapter, and the last shortcoming (using 
the Hagens and Russell framework) directly below. 
Hagens and Russell's Test for Insulation from Shocks 
Hagens and Russell's basic wage equation22 is 
. . 
Wt = A0Rt + A1L(Pt_1) + A2(Ut-Ut). (2.5) 
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In equation (2.5), W is the percentage change in labor compensation, R 
the trend labor productivity growth rate, P the percentage change in 
consuner prices, L a 12 quarter polynomial distributed lag function, tJ 
the actual unemployment rate, and U the natural unemployment rate. The 
12 quarter lag on inflation starts with the variable lagged 
and has its far endpoint constrained to zero; i.e., L(Pt_1) 
1 quarter, 
12 
= La.Pt .• 
. 1 1 -1 1= 
This equation is estimated without a constant term, because 
Hagens and Russell argued that in wage equations with no inflationary 
bias, the constant term should be equal to the trend rate of growth of 
labor productivity. Since trend productivity growth has not been 
constant in the United States, the constant term has been replaced with 
a trend productivity variable. Other variables, such as changes in 
employment taxes and minimum wage rates, are also incorporated into 
equation (2.5), but they are not important for the argument developed 
here. 
When Hagens and Russell tested the hypothesis that the Carter 
standards prevented the energy price explosion of 1979-80 from being 
incorporated into wage demands, the equation they estimated was of the 
general form 
(2.6) 
. . . . 
+ A3L(Et-1-Pt-1) + A4L[(Et-1-Pt-1)Dt-1 1, 
where E is the percentage change in energy prices and Dt is equal to 1 
for 1979:1 through 1980:2, and 0 otherwise. The purpose of the term 
. . 
A3L(Et_1-Pt_1) in equation (2.6) is to determine whether expectations 
. 
about energy price inflation (Et_1) and non-energy price inflation 
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(Nt_1) are generated by the same mechanism that ~reduces expectations 
. 
about overall inflation (Pt_ 1). According to Hagens and Russell, 
if the same mechanism holds, A3 will equal zero, which is what they 
. . 
found. ine term A4Lr(Et_1-Pt_1)Dt_1 l is used to determine whether 
the energy price increases were passed on in the form of higher wages 
during the Carter standards. If COWPS did not allow energy price 
increases to increase wages, A4 would be negative. Otherwise, A4 would 
equal zero since the effect of energy price increases would be seen in 
. 
L(Pt_1). The fact that energy price increases would show up in overall 
inflation would be guaranteed by A3 being equal to zero. 
This does not mean, however, that Hagens and Russell's framework 
is void of errors. One problem is that equation (2.6) is not 
consistent with equation (2.5), which underlies their analysis. Using 
. 
the identity Pt = b0Et + (1-b0)Nt, where b0 is the relative importance 
of energy prices in the Consumer Price lndex, 23 it follows that 
. . 
lated to yield equation (2.6). Ignoring the term A4L(Et_1-Pt_1)Dt_1, 
. 
and substituting for L(Pt .) in equation (2.5) yields 
-1 
. 
Wt = A0Rt + A1L[(b0)Et_1 l + A3Lr(1-b0)Nt_1 1 (2.7) 
Trying to rearrange equation (2.7) to conform to equation (2.5) yields 
. . . 
Wt = AORt + A1L[(bO)(Et-1-Pt-1 )] + A3L(Pt-1) (2.8) 
. . 
+ A4L[(1-b0)(Nt_1-Pt_1)1 + A2(Ut-Ut) 
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This equation could not be estimated since 
. . . . 
L[(bO)(Et-1-Pt-1)1 = -L[(1-bO)Nt-1-Pt-1)]. 
. . 
In addition, the term L((Et_1-Pt_ 1)Dt_1 l in equation (2.6) is 
puzzling. It is non-zero from 1979:2 through 19R~:2, due to the fact 
that D is lagged 12 quarters and has a non-zero value (unlagged) from 
· 1979:1 through 1980:2. In 19R3:2 for example, this term would be equal 
. . 
to a12fEt_12-Pt_12)Dt_12l, implying that tne standards were operational 
for 10 quarters after the standards period ended. It seems unrealistic 
that in 1983:2, workers would still be reducing pay demands in response 
to 1980:2 relative price movements. A more realistic assumption is 
that the former patterns would re-emerge once the standards were 
lifted. Thus the term L(Dt~ 1 ) should be Dt' and using equation (2.7) 
to underlie their energy price-shock equation, Hagens and Russell 
should have est~ated the energy price-shock equation as 
(2. 9) 
If the Carter standards had dampened the effects of energy 
prices, A4 would be negative; otherwise, A4 would equal zero. 
Using the Hagens and Russell quarterly data, a more complete 
ver.sion of equation (2.9) that included additional explanatory 
variables was e.stimated from the second quarter of 1954 to the second 
quarter of 1983 in an attempt to determine if the Carter standards had 
prevented the energy price-shocks from causing higher pay inflation. 24 
This new equation is 
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(2.10) 
where DATADUM is a dummy variable that corrects for the effects of 
linking two different wage series, HRCHSSTAX is the annualized 
percentage change in employment taxes, CHMINWA is the percentage change 
in the minimum wage, GUIDPS is a dummy variable representing the 
Kennedy-Johnson guidepost program, and ESP1 and ESP2 are dummy 
variables representing Phases I and II and Phases III and IV, 
respectively, of the Nixon Economic Stabilization Program.25 The 
coefficient K0 equals A1b0 , K1 equals A3(1-b0), and K2 has replaced A4• 
Table I contains the parameter estimates of equation (2.10), and the 
variables are listed and defined in Table II. 
The estimated coefficient of R, the trend productivity variable 
which replaced the constant term in equation (2.10), is positive (as 
expected) and statistically significant. It indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in trend productivity results in a 1.161 
percent increase in wage inflation; this coefficient is significantly 
greater than its theoretically expected value of 1. 
The estimated coefficient of the difference between the actual 
and natural unemployment rates, U - U, is statistically significant, 
and it implies that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate lowers the wage inflation rate by 0.592 percentage points. 
The third variable, DATADUM, is a dummy variable that corrects for 
the effects of linking two different data series. Starting in 1964:1, 
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TABLE 1 
MODIFIED WAGF. EQUATION 
Variable f.qn 2. 10 
R 1.161* 
(16.231) 
u-U -0.592* 
(-7.046) 
DATADUM -1. 3R1 
( -1. 502) 
HRCHSSTAX 1 . 038* 
( 8.239) 
CHMINWA 0.021* 
( 4.24) 
GUIDPS -0.625* 
(-2.4R2) 
ESP1 0.45 
( 0.976) 
ESP2 -0.616 
(-1.27) 
. 
L(Et-1) 0.007 ( 1.069) 
. 
L(Nt-1) 0.8R* (24.954) 
. 
L(Et_1)Dt -0. 121 * (-7.213) 
Adjusted R2 0.982 
Standard Error 0.889 
Durbin-Watson 1. 698 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
The sample period is 1954:2 through 1983:2; t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
The dependent variable is W. 
L( ) connotes a third-degree polynomial distributed lag, with the far 
endpoint constrained to zero. The lag length is 12 quarters, starting 
with the variable lagged 1 quarter. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Variable 
w 
HRPAY 
HRJ 
HRWSS 
HRWS 
R 
HRCHPROD 
HRCHGAP 
GNPGAP 
GNP 
TABLE 11 
HAGENS AND RUSStLL'S VARIABLES 
Definition 
Annualized percentage change 
in HRPAY 
HRJ x HRWSS/HRWS 
Hourly earnings index of 
production workers in the 
private nonfarm sector. This 
.series is adjusted for over-
time (in manufacturing) and 
for interindustry shifts in 
employment 
Compensation of employees 
Wages and salaries 
Estimated trend rate of 
productivity growth, obtained 
by regressing HRCHPROD on 
HRCHGAP, HRCHGAP_1, TIME, 
and HRDEOE, the period of 
estimation being 1953:1 to 
1980:3, and using the fitted 
values setting HRCHGAP, 
HRCHGAP_1, and HRDEOE equal 
to zero 
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Hagens and Russell's 
Sources 
1954-63: Gordon 
(1971); 1964-83: 
&lreau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
National Income 
Accounts (NIA) 
NIA 
Annualized percentage change BLS 
in output per man-hour in the 
nonfarm business sector 
Annualized percentage change 
in GNPGAP 
((POTGNP-GNP)/POTGNP) X 100 
Gross National Product-1972 
dollars 
NIA 
POTGNP 
TIME 
HRDEOE 
u 
iJ 
DATADlJM 
HRCHSSTAX 
HRTWER 
CHMINWA 
GUIDPS 
ESP1 
ESP2 
TABLE II (Continued) 
Potential GNP-1972 dollars 
1 for 1953:1, 2 for 1953:2, 
and so on 
End of expansion dummy 
Unemployment rate for 
civilian \\Orkers 
Natural unemployment rate 
1 for 1964:1, 0 otherwise, 
corrects for the effects of 
linking two different wage 
series 
Annualized percentage change 
in 1/(1-HRTWER/HRWS) 
Employer contributions for 
social insurance 
Annualized percentage change 
in the minimum hourly wage 
for all covered and nonexempt 
workers 
Kennedy-Johnson Guideposts, 
.25 for 1962:1, .5 for 1962:2, 
.75 for 1962:3, 1 for 1962:4 
to 1966:4, .75 for 1967:1, 
.5 for 1967:2, .25 for 1967:3, 
0 otherwise 
Nixon Controls-Phases I and 11, 
.5 for 1971:3, 1 for 1971:4 to 
1972:4, .167 for 1973:1, 0 
otherwise 
Nixon Controls-Phases III 
and IV, .R33 for 1973:1, 1 
for 1973:2 to 1974:1, .333 
for 1974:2, q otherwise 
Council of Economic 
Advisors 
Gordon (1979) 
BLS 
32 
Gordon (1978) 
NIA 
Office of Fair 
Labor Statistics, 
Department of Labor 
E 
N 
D 
TARLE ll (Continued) 
Annualized percentage change 
in the energy component of 
the consumer price index 
Annualized percentage cnange 
in the non-energy component 
of the consumer price index 
(Note: This variable was 
not used in Hagens and 
Russell's work; therefore, 
any errors in the construction 
of this variable were 
committed by the author, 
and not by Hagens and 
Russell) 
Dummy variable representing 
the energy price shock of 
1979:1 through 1980:2, equal 
to 1 for this period, 0 
otherwise 
Constructed using 
BLS data 
1951-1957: 
Constructed using 
data from Hagens 
and Russell and the 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; 1958-
1983; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
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a new wage series is used (see Table II) . Consequently, an error is 
introduced into the calculation of the percentage change in pay for 
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that quarter. To compensate, dummy variable DATAD!M is introduced; it 
has a value of 1 for 1964:1 and zero elsewhere. It is not statisti-
cally significant. 
The fourth variable, HRCHSSTAX, reflects the effects of changes in 
employment taxes on the wage inflation rate. The estimated coefficient 
is not statistically different from 1, which implies that all of an 
increase in employment taxes is passed forward in the form of higher 
prices, and none is passed backwarJ in the form of lower wages. 
The fifth variable, CHMlNWA, reflects the effects of changes in 
the minimum wage on the wage inflation rate. While the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero, it is also very small, indicating 
that a ten percentage point increase in the minimum wage would only 
increase employee compensation by approximately tVAJ-tenths of one per-
centage point. 
The sixth variable, GUIDPS is an intercept-shift dummy that takes 
into account the effects of the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts. 26 Perry's 
approach of phasing the guideposts in during 1962 and phasing them out 
during 1967 is used. The coefficient implies that the guideposts 
lowered wage inflation by 0.625 percentage points. 
Similarly, the next two variables, ESP1 and ESP2, represent the 
two phases of the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization 
Program. Phases I and II (August 1971 - January 1973) of the Nixon 
Program, designated as ESP1 were periods of mandatory controls, while 
Phases III and IV (January 1973 - April 1974), designated as ESP2, were 
periods of decontrol. These two variables are phased in and out in a 
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fashion similar to that of the GUIDPS variable. The estimated 
coefficients of both ESP1 and ESP2 are not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that the Nixon program had no effect on wage 
innation. 
The ninth coefficient is the sum of the coefficients of the 
distributed lag on energy prices. This coefficient is not 
statistically significant, indicating that over the 30 year sample 
period changes in energy prices did not have an impact on the rate of 
wage innation. 
The tenth coefficient is the sum of the coefficients of the 
distributed lag on non-energy prices. Tnis coefficient is highly 
significant, and indicates that a one percentage point increase in non-
energy prices results in a 0.88 percentage point increase in labor 
compensation. 
The final coefficient, the one that tests whether the Carter 
standards prevented the pass through of energy price increases to labor 
compensation, is the sum of the coefficients of the distributed lag on 
energy prices incorporated with a dummy variable for the period of the 
energy price shook. The coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, and implies that the Carter standards prevented the energy 
price explosion from getting built into wage demands. This conclusion, 
derived from a wage equation based on adaptive expectations, is 
consistent with the principal conclusion of the Hagens and Russell 
study. 
As noted earlier, however, expectations may be rational, and the 
relevant wage equations should be estimated in a rational expectations 
frame~rk. This problem, as well as the problem of interacting the 
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dummy variables representing both the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon incomes 
policies with the appropriate explanatory variable~, will be addressed 
in the empirical work in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE EfFECTIVENESS 
OF THE CARTER STANDARDS 
Introduction 
As noted earlier, all prior studies dealing with the effects of 
· incomes policies on wage inflation have relied on the hypothesis that 
expectations of inflation are formed adaptively; i.e., the expected 
price level in time period t is a weighted average of past price 
levels, with the most recent periods weighted the most heavily. One 
problem with this approach is that it ignores information (such as a 
change in the growth rate of the money supply or a change in fiscal 
policy) that may be relevant in predicting changes in the price 
level. 
In this chapter, we use an alternative theory of expectations. 
This alternative theory, known as rational expectations, 1 incorporates 
all relevant information into the formation of expectations. Errors 
may still be made in predicting changes in the price level, but these 
errors are not systematic. 
In addition to dealing with the assumption that expectations are 
formulated adaptively, we will also deal with the problem found in the 
work of Hagens and Russell of interacting a particular independent 
variable with dummy variables representing only the phases of the 
Carter standards. The interacted independent variable should be 
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interacted with dummy variables representing previous incomes policies, 
or their phases, as well. 
We begin this chapter by discussing the econometric methodology to 
be used in conjunction with rational expectations. We then apply this 
methodology to the four hypotheses Hagens and Russell tested. The 
hypotheses are that the Carter standards (1) brought wage demands into 
line with trend-productivity growth, (2) changed the inflation-
unemployment trade-off, (3) deflated inflationary expectations, and (4) 
insulated the economy from energy-price shocks. In addition, we will 
also correct the variable interaction problem found in Hagens and 
Russell's tests of the first three hypotheses. 
The Econometric Methodology of Rational Expectations 
Rational expectations implies that the anticipations of Xt, where 
Xt represents some variable such as inflation, money growth, or nominal 
GNP growth will be formed optimally, using all available information 
and linear forecasting models. 2 A forecasting equation that can be 
used to generate these anticipations is 
(3.1) 
where Zt_1 = a row vector of variables used to forecast Xt which are 
available at time t-1 (this includes variables known 
at t-1, t-2, t-3, etc.), 
g = a vector of coefficients, 
Ut = an error term which is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
any information available at t-1 (which includes Zt_1 
or ut_1 for all iL1, implying that Ut is serially 
unoorrelated) • 
Due to the market's subjective probability distribution of out-
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comes being distributed about the objective probability distribution of 
outcomes, an optimal forecast for Xt conditional on information avail-
able at t-1 would be 
(3.2) 
e 
where Xt =anticipated Xt conditional on information available at t-1. 
Specification of the Forecasting Equation 
e 
Rational expectations theory implies that Xt is an optimal, one-
period forecast, conditional on available information. Therefore, an 
appropriate forecasting equation for Xt should rely only on lagged 
explanatory variables. Theoretically, any piece of information avail-
able at time t-1 may be a useful predictor of ~ even if there is no 
strong reason to include it in the Zt_1 vector, simply because the 
personalities involved in policy making may be such that they react to 
this variable nonetheless. For example, if the Federal Reserve linked 
the growth rate of M1 to the unemployment rate, even though there is no 
reason to do so in a world where the policy ineffectiveness proposition 
holds, the unemployment rate would be a useful predictor of the M1 
growth rate. As a result, an atheoretical statistical procedure may be 
superior to economic theory in generating an accurate model of 
expectations formation. 
The Granger "causality" concept is a natural way to approach the 
specification of the forecasting model. 3 A variable Z is said to 
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Granger-cause another variable X, if the prediction of X can be 
significantly nnproved by using past values of Z and X as opposed to 
using past values of X alone. Lagged values of X should be included in 
the forecasting equation of X to eliminate any serial correlation in 
the residuals. Should Z Granger-cause X, then it should also be 
included in the optimal forecast of X. 
The procedure used for specifying the forecasting equation in this 
study is as follows. The X variable is regressed on its own lagged 
values as well as on the lagged values of a wide ranging set of 
variables. The number of lagged values of the X variable initially 
retained is determined by the last lagged value of X that is signifi-
cant at the five percent level in the initial uninterrupted string of 
significant lagged X's. For example, if X is lagged 4 quarters and 
only quarters 1, 2, and 4 are significant, then Xt_1 and Xt_2 are 
included in the forecasting equation. The Z variables included in the 
forecasting equation are limited to those variables that are jointly 
significant at the five percent level. The number of lagged values of 
the Z variables included in the forecasting equation is determined in 
the same manner as the number of lagged values of the X variable. This 
procedure has the advantage of imposing a discipline on the researcher 
that prevents his/her searching for a forecasting equation that yields 
results confirming his/her "desired" results. In addition, a stepwise 
regression procedure may miss significant explanatory variables because 
of the order in which the regressors enter the regressions. 
Testing for Rational Ex~ctations 
Once the forecasting equation is specified, it can be 
"substituted" into the general model 
N e 
x_· b.Xt. Yt = dMt + 1 -1 + et' 
i:O 
giving us 
where Yt = de~ndent variable at time t; 
d = a vector of coefficients; 
(3. 3) 
(3.4) 
Mt = a vector of explanatory variables which are available 
time t and do not enter (3 .4) through the Zt_1 vector; 
b. = a vector of coefficients; 1 
et = an error term which may be serially correlated but is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the right-hand-side 
variables. 
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at 
The assumption that all the right-hand-side variables are exogenous and 
are uncorrelated with the error term implies that the least-squares 
estimation methods will yield consistent estimates of the b's. 
The method for estimating this rational expectations model 
involves joint, nonlinear estimation of the equations (3.1) and (3.4) 
system, which is reproduced as 
xt = zt_,s + 11t (3.5) 
N 
Yt = dMt + I. b. (Zt 1 .g) + et. 
. 0 1 - -1 1= 
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System (3.5) imposes rationality of expectations since the 
ooeffioient g whioh appears in the equation for Xt also appears in the 
equation for Yt• Relaxing the rationality constraint, system (3.5) 
becomes 
xt = 2t-1g + 0t 
N 
Yt = dMt + L b. ( zt 1 . g*) + et' i:O 1 - -1 
where g* = vector of (unconstrained) coefficients. 
(3. 6) 
A comparison of the estimated systems (3.5) and (3.6) provides a 
test of the null hypothesis of rationality, that is, g = g*. 
The following procedure4 is used to estimate the chi-square (x2) 
statistic necessary for testing the null hypothesis of rationality. 
Estimation of system (3.5) proceeds under the identifying assumption 
that the y equation is a true reduced form. This assumption implies 
that the covariance of the error terms in the X and y equations of 
system (3.5) is zero. Consequently, an initial estimate for the 
.1\ 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, ~, is made assuming that 
I 
I 
SSRX/n 0 I A I 
~ = I I , 0 SSRY/n I I 
(3.7) 
where SSRX = the sum of squared residuals of the X equation, 
SSR = the SU'TI of y squared residuals of the y equation, 
.. 
n = the nll'Tiber of observations. 
A 
The initial ~ is obtained from unconstrained ordinary least squares 
A 
estimates of the X and y equations. Once L is estimated, the 
constrained system can be estimated with nonlinear generalized least 
squares (GLS). Given the particular diagonal form of the matrix, 
nonlinear GLS is equivalent to nonlinear weighted least squares (WLS) 
A 
using the estimates from~; i.e., the observations for the X 
forecasting equation are weighted by ~SSRx/SSR , so that 
. y 
(~SSRX/SSRY)- 1 Xt equals (./SSRX/SSRY)-1 (Zt_1g + Ut). After the 
A 
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system is estimated using this procedure, a new~ matrix can be esti-
mated and the iterative procedure that corrects for heteroscedasticity 
across the equations continues as follows. The variables in the X 
equation are weighted by the ratio from the previous iteration of the 
standard error of the X equation divided by the standard error of the y 
equation. This means that the weighting variable from the previous 
iteration (originally ~SSRX/SSRY) must be multiplied by the standard 
error of the weighted X equation divided by the standard error of the y 
equation. The system is then re-estimated with nonlinear WLS. The 
newly estimated residuals are then used to re-weight the X equation in 
the manner described directly above. This iterative procedure is 
continued until the standard errors of the weighted X forecasting 
equation and the y equation differ by less than 2.5 percent. Because 
the system is triangular, this procedure will converge to maximum-
likelihood estimates, since theorems showing that iterative three-
stage-least squares is equivalent to full-information-maximum-likeli-
hood then apply to this nonlinear case as well. 
In unconstrained system (3.6) no constraints are imposed on the Yt 
equation (i.e., rationality is not imposed). Therefore, both the Xt 
and Yt equations can be estimated separately using ordinary least 
squares. 
The likelihood ratio statistic, which is distributed asymptoti-
cally as x2Cq) under the null hypothesis, is 
47 
(3.8) 
1\ 
with superscripts on the 2: indicating that the maximized likelihood of 
both the constrained and unconstrained systems are estimated with the 
same weighting matrix ~c, where 
q = the number of constraints, 
Lc 
= maximized likelihood of the constrained system, 
Lu = maximized likelihood of the unconstrained system, 
ll.c A 
l: = the resulting estimated ~ for the constrained system, 
SSR0 = the sum of squared residuals from the constrained weighted 
system, 
SSRu = the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained 
system, 
n = the number of observations. 
u u u 2 
Note that SSR equals (SSRX + SSRY)/(HETA) , where HETA is the 
weighting variable used in the constrained system's final iteration. 
Comparison of this statistic with the critical x2(q) then tests the 
null hypothesis of rationality. 
One problem concerning estimation remains to be resolved. Since 
the test statistics assume serially uncorrelated error terms, serial 
correlation must be eliminated from the residuals. So long as lagged 
dependent variables are included in the forecasting equation there 
should be little serial correlation in the Ut residuals and no serial 
correlation correction will be needed. Since there is no theoretical 
argument guaranteeing that the error term in the y equation is serially 
uncorrelated, however, the error term in the y equations estimated 
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later is assumed to be a fourth-order autoregressive process. 5 Fourth-
order autoregressions usually eliminate most serial correlation in 
quarterly, macroeconomic time series. 
Rational Expectations and Trend Productivity 
The first hypothesis tested by Hagens and Russell is whether the 
Carter program brought wage inflation into line with trend productivity 
growth. The rational expectations system outlined above can now be 
used to test this hypothesis. We begin by estimating the expected 
price inflation equation. 
The Consumer Price Index Inflation Forecasting Equation 
In the adaptive expectations approach to testing the effective-
ness of an incomes policy in slowing wage inflation, one of the 
explanatory variables included in the wage equation is a distributed 
lag on past inflation. The rational expectations approach uses the 
forecast of expected inflation, conditional on available information, 
in place of the distributed lag used in the adaptive expectations 
studies. An optimal forecast for inflation is developed by using the 
procedure outlined in the section on the specification of the fore-
casting equation. 
Table III contains the parameter estimates of the expected price 
inflation equation. In equation (3.9), the dependent variable is the 
annualized percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI). The 
independent variables are listed and defined in Table IV. 
Using the M1 definition of the money supply, the results indicate 
that, for the most part, increases in the growth rate of the money 
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TABLE Ill 
EXPECTED PRICE INFLATION EQUATION 
Variable Fqn (3.9) 
Constant -.142 
(. 323) 
M1L1 .294* 
( .054) 
DUM1 1. 719 
(1.873) 
CPIL1 .788* 
(. 045) 
BUDL1 .019* 
(. 006) 
Adjusted R2 .784 
Standard error 1. 839 
Durbin h -1.069 
The sample period is 1954:2 through 198j:2; standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is CPIL. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Variable 
M1L 
TABLE IV 
VARIABLES 
Definition 
Annualized percentage change in 
the money supply (M1); the number 
appended to the variable refers 
to the number of quarters the 
variable is lagged 
DUM1 1 for 1959:2, 0 otherwise, used with 
M1L1; corrects for linking old M1 and 
new M1 in 1959:1 
DUM2 1 for 1959:3, 0 otherwise, used with 
M1L2; corrects for linking old M1 and 
new M1 in 1959:1 
CPIL Annualized percentage change in the 
consumer price index for urban 
consumers, the number appended to 
the variable refers to the number 
of quarters the variable is lagged 
BUDL Government surplus or deficit 
(annual rate); the number appended 
to the variable refers to the number 
of quarters the variable is lagged 
TR Estimated trend rate of productivity 
growth, obtained by regressing 
CHPROD on CHQ, CHQ_1, CH0_2 , 
TIME, and DEOE, and using the 
fitted values setting ~Q, CH0_1, 
CHQ_2, and DEOE equal to zero, 
the period of estimation being 
1953:1 to 1983:4 
CHPROD Annualized percentage change in 
output per man-hour in the nonfarm 
business sector 
GNP Real gross national product - 1972 
dollars 
NATRGNP Natural Real GNP - 1972 dollars 
Q (GNP/NATRGNP) 
Source 
Survey of Current 
Business 
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Business Conditions 
Digest 
Constructed in a 
manner similar to 
Gordon's (1979) 
specification 
Business Conditions 
'Digest 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Gordon (1984) 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
CHQ Annualized percentage change in Q 
TIME 1 for 1953:1, 2 for 1953:2, and so on 
DEOE .25 for the first four quarters 
following a peak of (GNP/NATRGNP); 
-.20 for the next five quarters 
UNEMRDI Unemployment rate (U) for civilian 
labor force less the natural 
unemployment rate (0) 
CHMINWA Annualized percentage change in the 
minimum hourly wage for all covered 
and nonexempt workers 
DATADUM 1 for 1964:1, 0 otherwise, corrects 
for the effect of linking two 
different wage series 
Constructed in a 
manner similar to 
Gordon's {1979) 
original 
specification 
lJ from Business 
Conditions 
Digest; (ij) 
from Gordon 
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( 1984) 
Hagens and Russell 
GUIDPS Kennedy-Johnson Guideposts, .25 for Hagens and Russell 
1962: 1 , • 5 for 1 962: 2, • 75 for 
1962:3, 1 for 1962:4 through 1966:4, 
.75 for 1967:1, .5 for 1967:2, .25 
for 1967:3, 0 otherwise 
ESP1 Nixon Controls-Phases 1 and II, .5 Hagens and Russell 
for 1971:3, 1 for 1971:4 through 
1972:4, .167 for 1973:1, 0 otherwise 
ESP2 Nixon Controls-Phases 111 and IV, Hagens and Russell 
.833 for 1973:1, 1 for 1973:2 through 
1974:1, .333 for 1974:2, 0 otherwise 
STD1 Carter Standards-first year Hagens and Russell 
(approximately), .667 for 1978:4, 
1 for 1979:1 through 1979:4, 0 
otherwise 
STD2 Carter Standards-second year, 1 for Hagens and Russell 
1980:1 through 1980:3, .75 for 
1980:4, 0 otherwise 
TWER 
ws 
CHSSTAX 
J 
wss 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Employer contributions for social 
insurance 
Wage and salaries 
Annualized percentage change in 
1 I ( 1 - TWER/WS) 
Hourly earnings index of production 
workers in private nonfarm sector. 
This series is adjusted for overtime 
(in manufacturing) and for inter-
industry shifts in employment 
Compensation of employees 
PAY J x WSS/WS 
C Annualized percentage change in PAY 
E 
CHECPI 
N 
CHNON 
Annualized percentage change in the 
energy component of the consumer 
price index 
Lagged values of E; the number 
appended to the variable refers to 
the number of quarters the variable 
is lagged 
Annualized percentage change in the 
non-energy component of the consumer 
price index 
Lagged values of N; the number 
appended to the variable refers 
to the number of quarters the 
variable is lagged 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Survey of Current 
Busines.::> 
1954-6~: Gordon 
( 1971); 1964-83: 
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Business Conditions 
Digest 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Hagens and Russell 
1951-1957: 
Constructed using 
data from Hagens 
and Russell and the 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; 1958-
1983: fureau of 
Labor Statistics 
D 
CHCRUDP 
CHCRUIJ-1 
CHPROF 
CHELSAL 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Dummy variable representing the 
energy price shock of 1979:1 
through 1980:2, equal to 1 for this 
period, 0 otherwise 
Annualized percentage change in U.S. 
domestic crude oil production; the 
number appended to the variable refers 
to the number of quarters the variable 
is lagged 
Annualized percentage change in U.S. 
crude oil imports; the number 
appended to the variable refers to 
the number of quarters the variable 
is lagged 
Annualized percentage change in U.S. 
private domestic petroleum refining; 
the number appended to the variable 
refers to the number of quarters the 
variable is lagged 
Annualized percentage change in 
electricity sales to ultimate 
consumers in the U.S.; the number 
appended to the variable refers to 
the number of quarters the variable 
is lagged 
Hagens and Russell 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Survey of Current 
BUsiness 
Survey of Current 
Business 
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supply increase the expected inflation rate. Equation (3.9) shows that 
a one percent increase in M1 in period t-1 (M1L1) results in an 
increase in the expected inflation rate in period t of .294 percent. 
The third variable, DUM1, is a dummy variable that corrects for 
the effects of linking different M1 data series. The change from old 
M1 to new M1 occurred in 1959:1. Consequently, an error is introduced 
into the calculation of M1L1 for 1959:2. To compensate, dummy variable 
DUM1 is introduced. This dummy variable is insignificant. 
The fourth variable represents past inflation rates. A one per-
cent increase in the CPl in period t-1 (CPlL1) results in an increase 
in the CPI in period t of .788 percent. 
BUDL1 is the budget surplus for all levels of U.S. government in 
period t-1. Interpretation of the estimated coefficient implies that a 
$100 billion dollar budget surplus results in an increase in the 
expected inflation rate in period t of 1.94 percent. While this result 
seems counter-intuitive at first glance, closer examination reveals one 
possible explanation. The magnitude of the budget surplus is 
influenced by current economic conditions and when the economy 
experiences a recession, tax revenues decline and transfer payments 
increase, thereby decreasing the magnitude of the budget surplus. 
Assuming that prices do not rise as rapidly during periods of 
contraction as during periods of expansion, lower inflation rates in 
period t may be associated with smaller budget surpluses in time period 
. 6 
t-1. 
The Wage Inflation Equations 
The Xt, or expected price inflation equation (3.9) was estimated 
in system (3.6). The next step is to estimate the Yt' or wage 
inflation equation in system (3.6). 
For each potential lag length to be used in estimating the wage 
inflation equation in constrained system (3.S), a separate wage 
inflation equation must be estimated for unconstrained system (3.6). 
Using forecasting equation (3.9) and assuming the inflationary 
expectations variable in system (3.5) is unlagged, the unconstrained 
equation estimated is 
C = d1TR + d2UNEMRDI + d3CHSSTAX + J4CHMINWA + d5DATADUM (3.10) 
+ d6GUIDPSTR + d7ESP1TR + dBESP2TR + d9STD1TR 
+ d10ESP2TR + g1Constant + g2M1L1 + g3DUM1 + g4CPIL1 
+ g5BUDL1 + et. 
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If the inflationary expectations variable in system (3.5) is 
lagged one quarter, equation (3.10) would be modified to include the 
variables M1L2, DUM2, CPIL2, and BliDL2. Similarly, as the inflationary 
expectations variable is lagged N additional quarters, MIL, DUM, CPIL, 
and BUDL are all lagged N additional quarters. 
Since equation (3.10) is estimated merely to obtain the SSR's used 
to compute the x2 statistic for testing the rationality hypothesis, we 
do not present or discuss these results. 
In order to estimate the constrained system, the data are stacked 
so that system (3.5), a system of two linear equations, can be 
estimated as one equation with the appropriate nonlinear constraints. 
Using forecasting equation (3.9), the system is estimated 
C = d1TR + d2UNEMRDI + d3CHSSTAX + d4CHM1NWA + d5DATADUM (3.11) 
N e 
+ ~ b.CPILt . + d6GUIDPSTR + d7.ESP1TR + d0 ESP2TR i:O 1 -1 o 
where et = p1et-1 + p2et-2 + p3et-3 + p4et-4' and 
e 
CP!Lt = g1 + g2M1L1 + g3DUM1 +g4CPIL1 + g5BUDL1. 
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One of the most difficult issues in the wage inflation equation is 
the measurement of price inflation expectations. More specifically, 
why are both current and lagged values of inflationary expectations 
included in the wage inflation equation. There are two important 
factors to be considered. Pirst, wnen wages are set, forward-looking 
forecasts of prices and other wages influence the wage that emerges 
from the bargaining process the worker and the employer use to 
determine wages. For example, when a 3-year contract is negotiated, 
the built-in wage increases in the second and tnird years are larger if 
price inflation is expected to persist during the contract. If workers 
are informed about the economy, then these forward-looking forecasts 
will match rational expectations theory. Second, this influence of 
current expectations on the expected inflation term is only part of the 
story. It does not take into account that staggered labor contracts 
mean that the expectations term involves momentum that cannot be 
changed immediately. Fmployees and employers must take account of the 
wages that will be paid to other workers in the economy. Given the 
existence of staggered wage setting over time, some wages must be set 
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looking back at the previous wage decisions of other workers. For 
example, in the United States, about RO percent of labor contracts are 
three years in length, and are overlapping and staggered. 7 This means 
that the rate of wage change in any year, such as 19RO, would be partly 
determined by 1980 settlements, partly by 1979 settlements made the 
previous year, and partly by 197R settlements made two years before. 
Thus, at any point in time, workers may be worried about the 
inflationary effects of preexisting contracts still in effect, and they 
will form their wage demands accordingly. Wage inflation, therefore, 
involves inertia due to staggered labor contracts and relative wage 
setting. The price inflation expectations term must take account of 
this inertia. 8 
Hagens and Russell used a polynomial distributed lag on the CPIL 
variable. This is not the only possible specification, however, and 
for comparison purposes several of the hypotheses were tested in two 
separate ways, with and without this polynomial distributed lag. The 
appropriate lag length for CPIL is not known a priori, but is 
determined by minimizing .~emiya's9 prediction criteria (PC), ~1ere 
PC= s2 (1 + K/n). 
In the equation, s2 is the estimated error variance, K is the number 
of regressors, and n is the number of observations. 
At the .05 level of significance, rationality cannot be rejected 
for constrained wage inflation equations (3.11.10) and (3.11.12), 
presented in Table V. Rationality is rejected for the other equations. 
Note that these equations were estimated without a polynomial 
distributed lag restriction, and the variable CPILe is lagged from 
quarter t to t-13 in (3.11.10), and from t to t-15 in (3.11.12). Since 
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TABLE V 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS FOR TREND PRODUCTIVITY HYPOTHESIS 
TEST -- WITHOUT A POLYNOMIAL DISTRIBUTED LAG 
Variable 3.11.1 1.11 .2 3.11.3 3.11.4 3.11.5 3.11.6 
(5 lags) (6 lags) (7 lags) (8 lags) (9 lags) ( 10 lags) 
TR 1. 412* 1.42* 1. 419* 1.243* 1.234* 1.212* 
(.25) ( .25) . ( .255) (.19) (.183) (.179) 
UNEMRDI -.034 -.042 -.04 -.25 -.271 -.295* 
(.167) (.166) (. 171) (.142) (.14) ( .136) 
CHSSTAX .842* .844* .R44* .865* .86* .821 * 
(.202) (.205) ( .207) ( .205) (.209) (.213) 
CHMINWA .0055 .0055 .0054 .0092 .01 .011 
( .0065) (.0065) (.0066) ( .0062) ( .0062) ( .0061) 
DATADUM -1.861 -l. 844 -1.855 -1.793 -1.812 -1.895 
(1.145) (1.149) (1.154) (1.105) (1.116) (1.105) 
L:bi 1.533 1.511 1.545 1.281 1.244 1.23 
GUIDPSTR -.6* -.606* -.604* -.456* -.441* -.42* 
( .285) (.285) (.29) (.214) (.208) (.199) 
ESP1TR • 186 .181 • 182 .402 .407 .378 
( .46) (.467) ( • 472) (.368) ( .36) (. 348) 
ESP2TR -.843 -.854 -.844 -.672 -.696 -.743 
( .512) (.511) (.515) (.418) (.411) (.399) 
STD1TR -1.299* -1.259 -1.282 -1.46* -1.49* -1.557* 
(.658) (.657) (.663) (.568) (.561) ( .545) 
STD2TR 1.024 1.068 1.036 .988 1.004 1.022 
(.741) (. 742) (. 747) (.644) ( .639) ( .623) 
RH01 .3* .297* .299* . 17 . 148 • 121 
( .087) ( .09) ( .091) (.096) ( .099) (.1) 
RH02 -.098 -.098 -.096 -.083 -.09 -.093 
( .071) ( .071) ( . 072) (. 071) (. 071) ( .072) 
RH03 .268* .283* .286* .278* .275* .278* 
( • 072) C.072) (. 072) (. 072) (.072) (. 073) 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
RH04 .059 .06 .062 .03 .037 .042 
(. 067) (.068) (. 068) (. 068) (. 068) ( .069) 
Adjusted R2 .7298 .7277 • 7 238 .7601 .7601 .7626 
Standard 
Error 1.2574 1.2624 1. 2714 1. 1847 1.185 1.1787 
q 21 25 29 33 37 41 
x2 67.596 57.022 62. 114 72. 1194 86.5814 76.142 
Critical x2 32.67 37.646 42.r;r;2 47.4 52. 189 56.939 
PC 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Variable 3.11.7 3.11.8 3.11.9 3.11.10 3.11.11 3.11.12 (11 lags) (12 lags) (13 lags) (14 lags) ( 15 lags) (16 lags) 
TR 1.221 * 1.241 * 1.243* 1. 225* 1.253* 1.235* (.18) (.193) (.197) ( .209) ( .205) (.208) 
UNEMRDI -.304* -.343* -.349* -.379* -.378* -. 379* 
(.135) (. 139) (.143) (.148) (.145) (.147) 
CHSSTAX .83* .866* .868* .852* .851)* .845* 
(.216) (.216) ( .216) (.216) (.211) ( .217) 
CHMINWA .0113 .0104 .0103 .0082 .007') .0075 
(.006) (.006) (.006) ( .0062) ( .0062) ( .0063) 
DATADUM -1.781 -1.56 -1.562 -1.555 -1.512 -1.401 
(1.108) ( 1 .083) (1.088) (1.08) (1.076) ( 1. 091) 
L:bi 1.245 1.34 1.36 1. 459 1.41 1.435 
GUIDPSTR -.43* -.46* -.463* -.463* -.489* -.479* 
( .20) (.209) (.212) (.221) (.217) (.221) 
ESP1TR .316 • 167 .146 .068 .087 .074 
(.348) (. 3!:>9) (.368) (.384) (. 38) (. 384) 
ESP2TR -.818* -.882* -.893* -.921* -.901* -.911* 
(.3970 (. 402) (.406) (.418) (.415) ( .419) 
STD1TR -1.453* -1.116* -1.079 -1.001 -1.049 -1.048 
(.439) (. 549) (.555) L571) (.566) ( .571) 
STD2TR 1.156 1.223* 1.25* 1.333* 1.223* 1.298* 
(.619) (.618) ( .623) (. 639) ( .64) ( .65) 
RH01 .105 .137 .142 . 169 .17 • 173 
( .099) ( .095) ( .097) (.096) (.1) ( .1) 
RH02 
-.083 -.102 -.099 -.09 -.092 -.101 
( .07) ( .069) (.07) ( .071) (.071) (.071) 
RH03 .276* .301* .298* .312* .309* .316* 
(. 071) (. 071) (.071) (. 072) ( .073) ( .073) 
RH04 .056 .064 .068 .049 .038 .042 
(.068) (.068) ( .069) (.069) ( .07) (.071) 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Adjusted R2 .7626 .7663 ,7630 .7618 .7649 ,7625 
Standard 
Error 1.178R 1.1694 1.1776 1. 1 Ro6 1. 173 1.179 
q 45 49 53 ?7 61 65 
x2 74.579 70.919 74,766 1':>. 144 80.361 75.686 
Critical x2 61.653 66.336 70.991 75.622 80.23 84.819 
PC 1.7274 1. 7466 
The dependent variable is c. The sample period is 1954:2 through 19R3:2; 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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equation (3.11.10) has the lowest PC, the lag length (14 quarters) used 
in this equation is considered to be the most appropriate, and the 
discussion of the results (presented in table V) will focus on this 
equation. 
In a wage-price model with a constant expected inflation rate 
(with a coefficient equal to 1) and U equal to TI (with CHSSTAX and 
CHMINWA omitted), the equilibrium wage growth rate is equal to the 
trend labor productivity growth rate. As a result, in the wage 
inflation equations, the constant term is replaced with a trend 
productivity variable, constructed in a manner similar to that of 
Gordon. 10 The coefficient of TR, the trend productivity variable, in 
equation (3.11.10) is positive (as expected) and statistically signifi-
cant; it indicates that a one percentage point increase in trend 
productivity results in a 1.225 percentage point increase in wage 
inflation, which is not significantly different from its theoretically 
expected value of 1. 
The estimated coefficient of the difference between the actual and 
natural unemployment rates, UNEMRDI, is statistically significant, and 
it implies that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate lowers the rate of wage inflation by .379 percentage points. 
The third variable, CHSSTAX, reflects the effects of changes in 
employment taxes on the wage inflation rate. The estimated coefficient 
is not statistically different from 1, which implies that all of an 
increase in employment taxes is passed forward in the form of higher 
prices, and none is passed backward in the form of lower wages. 
ine fourth variable, CHMINWA, reflects the effects of changes in 
. the minimum wage on the wage inflation rate. The coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that changes in the 
minimum wage do not affect the wage inflation rate. 
The fifth variable listed, DATADl~, is a dummy variable that 
corrects for the effects of linking two different wage series. It is 
not statistically significant. 
The coefficient, l: bi' represents the effects of current and 
lagged expected price inflation rates on the rate of wage inflation. 
The sum of these coefficients is 1.459. Thus, a one percentage point 
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increase in expected inflation results in an increase in wage inflation 
of about one-and-a-half percentage points. 
To determine whether an incomes policy lowers the productivity 
factor in wage inflation equations, a dummy variable which interacts 
with the trend productivity variable is included. This variable, 
GUIDPSTR, takes into account the effects of the Kennedy-Johnson guide-
posts. Perry's approach of phasing the guideposts in during 1962 and 
phasing them out during 1967 is used; however, the misspecification 
found in previous studies is corrected by interacting the guideposts 
dummy with the trend productivity factor. 11 The estimated effect of 
the program on wage inflation is -1.0866 percentage points (the 
coefficient, -.489, multiplied by the average value of TR for the 
period, 2.222 percent), and the interaction variable, GUIDPSTR, is 
statistically significant. 
Similarly, the two variables ESP1TR and ESP2TR represent the two 
stages of the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization Program. 
Phases I and II (August 1971 - January 1973) of the Nixon program, 
designated as ESP1TR, were periods of mandatory controls, while Phases 
III and IV (January 1973- April 1974), designated as ESP2TR, were 
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periods of decontrol. Hagens and Russell's approach of phasing in and 
out the two ESP variables is adopted; however, their misspecification 
is corrected by interacting both of the ESP dummy variables with the 
trend productivity variable. The estimated effect of the first part of 
the program on wage inflation is .121 percentage points (the coeffi-
cient, .068, multiplied by the average value of TR for the period, 1.79 
percent). The estimated effect of the second part of the program is 
-1.563 percentage points (-.921 multiplied by 1.697). These estimates 
suggest that while Phases I and II did not affect wage inflation (the 
coefficient is not significant), Phases III and IV reduced it (the 
coefficient is significant). Hagens and Russell argued that this 
apparent anomaly is due to the fact that the lowered price inflation 
they doclll!ented in Phases I and II was not translated into an equally 
lower wage inflation rate, while the increased price inflation they 
documented in Phases III and IV was not passed through in the form of 
higher wage inflation. 
The two variables STD1TR and STD2TR are constructed in a manner 
similar to that of the three preceding variables. STD1 represents the 
first part of the Carter program (from 1978:4 through 1979:4), and STD2 
represents the second part (1980). These two dummy variables are 
interacted with the trend productivity variable, TR. The estimated 
effect on the wage inflation rate of the approximately first year of 
the program is -1.366 percentage points (the coefficient, -1.001, 
multiplied by the average value of TR for the year, 1.365). The esti-
mated effect of the second year of the program is 1.73 percentage 
points (1.333 multiplied by 1.298). 12 The coefficient for STD1TR 
is not significant, however, indicating that the first period of the 
2tandards had no impact on the wage inflation rate. 
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The coefficient for STD2TR is significant, indicating the second 
year of the standards actually added to wage inflation. ihe2e results 
are in direct conflict with those of Hagens and Russell, who found that 
the Carter standards did bring wage inflation into line with trend 
productivity growth. 
While the results of the effectiveness of the Carter standards 
presented here conflict with those of Hagens and Russell, it should be 
pointed out that Hagens and Russell used a 12 quarter distributed lag 
of past price inflation rates to measure inflationary expectations. 
The results presented above, while being based on the rational 
expectations approach instead of the adaptive expectations approach 
used in Hagens and Russell, also did not use the distributed lag 
restrictions Hagens and Russell used. To ascertain if this distributed 
lag restriction made any difference in the results obtained above, 
system (3.11) was re-estimated, with the inflationary expectations 
variable modeled as a third-degree polynomial distributed lag, with the 
far endpoint constrained to zero, the same approach that Hagens and 
Russell took. The lag length was allowed to vary from 11 to 15 
quarters. 
The results of this procedure are presented in Table VI. At the 
.05 significance level rationality cannot be rejected for equations 
(3.12.4) and (3.12.5). Rationality is rejected for the other equations 
in Table VI. Comparing (3.11.10) and (3.12.4), which have the same lag 
lengths (14 quarters) and the lowest PCs for their respective models, 
the polynomial distributed lag seems to have had some effect on the 
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TABLE VI 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS F'OR TREND PRODUCTIVITY HYPOTHESIS 
TEST -- USING A POLYNOMIAL DISTRIBUTED LAG 
Variable j. 12. 1 3.12.2 3.12.3 3. 12.4 3. 12.5 ( 11 lags) ( 12 lag.s) ( 13 lag.s) ( 14 lags) (15 lags) 
TR 1.269* 1. 244* 1. 264* 1. 231 * 1.23* 
(.183) (. 183) (.31)7) (. 192) (.178) 
UNEMRDI 
-.296* -.336* -.328* -.363* -.354* (. 136) (.139) (. 134) (.143) (. 16) 
CHSSTAX .75* .7:>6* .746* .746* .737* 
(. 138) (.136) (.139) (.134) (.137) 
CHMINWA .0116 .011:> .0117 .0102 .0097 ( .006) (.006) (.006) (. 0058) ( .0059) 
DATADUM 
-1.732 -1.621 -1.649 -1.687 -1.722 (1.075) (1.068) (1.076) (1.059) ( 1 • 08) 
Lbi 1 .218 1.24 1.328 1.504 1. 47 
GUlDPSTR 
-.437* -.437* -.463* -.458* -.464* ( .21) (.211) (.194) ( .21) ( .202) 
ESP1TR .293 .215 .152 .039 .014 
(.354) (.36) (.353) (. 361) (. 364) 
ESP2TR -.719 -.R1* -.745 -.R94* -.847* 
C.396) (.402) (. 394) (.396) (. 398) 
STD1TR 
-1.279* -1.194* -1.155* -1.086* -.999 
(.537) (.54) ( .507) (.531) (.529) 
STD2TR 1.601* 1.573* 1.477* 1.536* 1.518* 
(.608) (.615) (.575) (.597) (.604) 
RH01 .098 .086 .105 .144 .148 
(.092) ( .091) (.091) (. 088) ( .089) 
RH02 
-.098 -. 1 -.085 -.076 -.072 
(.066) ( .065) (.064) (. 065) (.065) 
RH03 .295* .302* .305* .306* .305* 
(.065) ( .064) (.064) (.064) (.065) 
TABLE Vl (Continued) 
RH04 .066 .067 .OR7 .081 
(. 063) ( .063) ( .063) ( .06j) 
Adjusted R2 .7468 .7542 ,7497 .7536 
Standard 
Error 1 • 2173 1.1993 1.2104 1.2007 
q 45 49 53 57 
x2 70.774 90.261 75.063 74.636 
Critical X2 61.653 66.336 70.991 75.622 
PC 1. 6512 
The dependent variable is C. The sample period is 1954:2 through 
1983:2; standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
The variable CPILe is lagged using a third-degree polynomial 
distributed lag, with the far endpoint constrained to zero. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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.086 
(.065) 
.7478 
1.2146 
61 
72.442 
80.23 
1. 6897 
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estimated coefficients, but not on the statistical significance of TR, 
UNEMRDI; CHSSTAX, CHMINWA, DATADUM, GUIDPSTR, AND ESP2TR. There was 
considerable change in the coefficients of ESP1TR, STD1TR, and STD2TR, 
and the coefficient for STD1TR changes from statistically insignificant 
to significant. The coefficient of ESP1TR fell from .068 to .039, 
implying that the estimated effect of the program fell from .121 to .07 
percentage points, while the coefficient of ~SP2TR decreased in abso-
lute terms from -.921 to -.894, indicating that the estimated effect 
decreased in absolute terms from -1.~63 to -1.~17 percentage points. 
The coefficients from (3.12.4) indicate that the first phase of the 
Nixon program led to higher wage inflation, while the second phase led 
to lower wage inflation. Note that the coefficient for the first phase 
did not differ significantly from zero while the coefficient for the 
second phase was statistically significant. For the Carter program, 
the coefficient for STD1TR decreased from -1.001 to -1.086; conse-
quently, the estimated effect increased from -1.366 to -1.4R2 percent-
age points. The STD2TR coefficient increased from 1.333 to 1.536 with 
the estimated effect increasing from 1.73 to 1.994 percentage points. 
The coefficients from (3~12.4) indicate that the first phase of the 
Carter program led to lower wage inflation while the second phase led 
to higher wage inflation. Since both coefficients differ significantly 
from zero, the two effects must be summed to determine if the Carter 
program significantly reduced wage inflation. The positive value of 
the STD2TR coefficient is greater, in absolute size, than the negative 
value of the STD1TR coefficient, indicating that any slowdown in wage 
inflation attributable to the first part of the program was overwhelmed 
by the increase in wage inflation attributable to the second part. 
e 
Tnere is also a change in the sum of the coefficients of CPILt. 
It increased from 1.459 to 1.504, indicating that a given change in 
inflationary expectations results in a slightly larger change in wage 
inflation than originally reported. 
In conclusion, tne use of the rational expectations approach in 
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modeling inflationary expectations (both with and without a polynomial 
distributed lag restriction) has led to results that are in direct 
conflict with those of Hagens and Russell; specifically, the rational 
expectations approach indicates that the Carter standards did not bring 
wage inflation into line with trend productivity growth. 
Rational Expectations and the Short-Run Phillips Curve 
The second hypothesis tested by Hagens and Russell was whether the 
Carter standards changed the inflation-unemployment trade-off. Using 
the adaptive expectations approach, Hagens and Russell concluded that 
the standards had no effect on the slope of the short-run Phillips 
curve. This same hypothesis will now be tested using the rational 
expectations approach. Equation (3.9), the price inflation expecta-
tions equation estimated above, will be used in the following analysis. 
A different set of wage inflation equations, however, will be 
estimated. 
The Wage Inflation Equations 
In the section dealing with the Carter program bringing wage 
inflation into line with trend productivity growth, unconstrained wage 
equation (3.10) and constrained wage equation (3.11) were estimated. 
In each equation, the trend productivity variable, TR, was interacted 
with the dummy variables representing the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts, 
GUIDPS, the two phases of the Nixon controls, ESP1 and ~SP2, and the 
two phases of the Carter standards, STD1 and STD2. 
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To test the effects of incomes policies in changing the slope of 
the short-run Phillips curve, each of the five dummy variables included 
to represent incomes policies or their phases must be interacted with 
the variable UNEMRDI, which is the difference between the unemployment 
rate, U, and the natural unemployment rate, U. 
An incomes policy would ideally steepen the slope of the short-run 
Phillips curve for increases in the unemployment rate. Steepening the 
slope for decreases in the unemployment rate would be perverse. 
Similarly, creating a positively sloped short-run Phillips curve for 
increases in the unemployment rate would be perverse. Alternatively, 
it might be hypothesized that the incomes policy would shift the short-
run Phillips curve toward the origin, improving the tradeoff in both 
directions. 
Using forecasting equation (3.9), and assuming the inflationary 
expectations variable in system (3.,) is unlagged, the unconstrained 
system estimated is 
C = d1TR + d2UNEMRD1 + d3CHSSTAX + d4CHMINWA 
+ d5DATADUM + d6GUIDPSUNEMRD1 + d.rESP1lJNEMRDI 
+ d8ESP2UNEMRDI + d9STD1UNEMRDI + d10STD2UNEMRDI 
+ g1CONSTANT + g2M1L1 + g3DUM1 + g4CPIL1 
+ g5BUDL1 + et. 
(3.13) 
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If the inflationary expectations variable in system (3.5) is lagged one 
quarter, system (3.13) would be modified to include the variables M1L2, 
DUM2, CPIL2, AND BUDL2. Similarly, as the inflationary expectations 
variable is lagged N additional quarters, M1L, DUM, CPIL, and BlJDL are 
all lagged N additional quarters. 
Since system (3.13) is estimated merely to obtain the SSR's used 
to compute the x2 statistic for testing the rationality hypothesis, we 
do not present or discuss these results. 
The constrained system estimated is 
C = d1TR + d2liNEMRDI + d3CHSSTAX 
'N e 
+ d4CHMINWA + d5DATADIJM + i~O hi CPILt_1 
+ d6GUIDPSUNEMRDI + d7F:SP11J'NEMRDI + dAESP2UNEMRDI 
+ ct9STD1UNEMRDI + d10STD2UNEMRDI + et' 
e 
(3. 14) 
CPlLt = g1CONSTANT + g2M1L1 + g3D~1 + g4CP1L1 + g5RUDL1. 
At the .05 level of significance, rationality cannot be rejected 
for constrained wage inflation equations (3.14.5), (3.14.6), (3.14.7), 
(3. 14. 8) , and (3. 14. 9) presented in Table VII. Note that these 
equations were estimated without a polynomial distributed lag 
restriction, and the variable CPILe is lagged from quarter t to t-11 in 
(3.14.5), from t to t-12 in (3.14.6), and so on. Since equation 
(3.14.5) has the lowest PC, the lag length ( 12 quarters) used in this 
equation is most appropriate, and the discussion of the results 
(presented in Table VII) will focus on this equation. 
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TARLE \n.I 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS FOR INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT 
HYPOTHESIS TEST -- ~.fiTHOUT A POLYNOMIAL DISTRIBUTED LAG 
Variable 3.14.1 3.14.2 ~.14.3 3.14.4 3.14.5 
(8 lags) (9 lags) ( 10 lags) ( 11 lags) ( 12 lags) 
TR 1 .223* 1.2H* 1 .201 * 1.206* 1. 201 * 
( .204) (.195) (. 193) (. 192) (.2) 
UNEMRDI 
-.245 -.277 -.294 -.309* -.365* 
(.162) (.157) (.156) (. 153) (.15) 
CHSSTAX .836* .832* .798* .809* .85* 
(.214) ( .217) ( .226) (.232) ( .222) 
CHMINWA • 01 .011 .0118 .0125 .0115 
(.006) ( .006) ( .0065) (. 0064) (.0061) 
DATADUM -2.045 -2.071 -2.165 -2.0')2 -1.804 
(1.149) (1.11)1) ( 1 . 152) (1.153) (1.094) 
Lbi 1. 383 1. 333 1. 328 1.335 1.428 
GUIDPSUNEMRDI .387 .394 .384 .404 .471 
{.431) (.414) (.406) (.397) (. 386) 
ESP1UNEMRDI -2.65 -2.62') -2.41') -2.287 -2.378 
(2.099) (2.062) (2. 031) (1.97')) ( 1.892) 
ESP2UNEMRDI 1.046 1.103 1.155 1. 339 1.473 
(.831) (.811) (.799) (. 783) (.7')4) 
STD1UNEMRDI 6.71 8.071 8.378 7.294 6.336 
(5.528) (5.617) (5.605) (5.572) (5.324) 
STD2UNEMRDI 1. 34* 1. 328* 1.402* 1.642* 1.555* 
(.614) (.606) (.606) (.607) (.579) 
RH01 .224* .2* . 18 . 149 . 169 
(.096) (.099) (. 1) (.1) (.094) 
RH02 -.082 -.091 -.099 -.081 -. 101 
( .073) (. 074) ( .074) ( .072) ( .071) 
RH03 .293* .29* .301* .299* .315* 
( .074) ( .074) ( .07')) ( . 073) (.072) 
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Table Vll (Continued) 
RH04 .028 .036 .041 .01)6 .061) 
( .07) ( .071) ( .072) ( .07) (. 069) 
Adjusted R2 .7341 .734 .7327 .736 .7533 
Standard 
Error 1.2471) 1.2476 1.2':;06 1.2431 1 .2015 
q 33 37 41 45 49 
i2 73.466 59. 10? 77.437 74.416 57.91) 
Critical X2 47.4 :>2. 189 56.939 61.653 66.336 
PC 1. 7645 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
Variable 3.14.6 3.14.7 3.14.13 3.14.9 
( 13 lags) ( 14 lags) ( 1? lags) ( 16 lags) 
TR 1.196* 1.171* 1.193* 1. 178* 
(.205) (.214) ( .211) (.21?) 
UNEMRDI -.378* -.4013* -.408* -.408* 
(.1')')) (.1')8) (.158) (.158) 
CHSSTAX .8?2* .831* .831* .824* 
( . 224) ( .22) (.218) (.221) 
CHMINWA .0116 .009') .0089 .0088 
( .0062) ( .0063) ( .0064) ( .0064) 
DATADUM -1.R13 -1.804 -1.783 -1.69') 
( 1 . 109) (1.093) (1.096) ( 1 . 102) 
Lb. 
1 
1. 461 1 . '337 1. 5055 1.5314 
GUIDPSUNEMRDI .491 .498 .522 .')1 
(. 395) (.401) ( .402) (.404) 
ESP1UNEMRDI -2.382 -2.068 -2.288 -2. 139 
(1.925) (1.9S1) ( 1 . 98) (1.984) 
ESP2UNEMRD1 1.504 1. 557* 1. 523 1. ?44* 
( .767) (.773) (.779) ( .779) 
STD1UNEMRDI 6.07 5.468 5.013 4.877 
(5. 394) (5.331) (5.369) (5.386) 
STD2UNEMRDI 1.534* 1.5478 1.487* 1. ?57* 
(. ?92) (.593) (.601) (.609) 
RH01 • 17? .191* • 196* • 199* 
(. 096) ( .095) (. 096) ( .098) 
RH02 -.098 -.084 -.087 -.095 
(. 071) ( .073) (. 073) (.073) 
RH03 .309* . 316* .316* .322* 
(. 072) (. 073) ( .074) (. 074) 
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TARLE Vll (Continued) 
RH04 .071 .05 .041 .04? ( .07) ( .07) (. 071) ( .072) 
Adjusted R2 .7499 .7~03 .7?13 .7486 
Standard 
Error 1.209q 1.2088 1.2065 1. 2128 
q 53 57 61 65 
i2 58.445 66.?35 70.394 73.215 
Critioal x2 70.991 7'3.622 80.23 84.819 
PC 1 • .'3016 1. 8107 1.8164 1.8481 
The dependent variable is C. The sample period is 1954:2 through 1Q83:2; 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*Signifioant at the 5 peroent level. 
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The coefficient of TR, the trend productivity variahle, is 
positive (as expected) and statistically significant; it indicates that 
a one percentage point increase in trend productivity results in a 
1.201 percentage point increase in wage inflation, which is not 
significantly different from its theoretically expected value of one. 
The estimated coefficient of UNEMRDI is statistically significant, 
and it implies that a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate lowers the rate of wage inflation by .36? percentage points. 
The estimated coefficient of CHSSTAX is not statistically 
different from one, which implies that all of an increase in employment 
taxes is passed forward in the form of higher prices, and none is 
passed backward in the form of lower wages. 
The fourth variable is the percentage change in the minimum wage. 
The coefficient is not significantly different from zero, indicating 
that changes in the minimum wage do not affect the wage inflation rate. 
Similarly, the coefficient for the fiftn variable, DATA DUM, is not 
statistically significant. 
The coefficient, ~ bi, indicates that a one percentage point 
increase in expected inflation results in an increase in wage inflation 
of about one-and-a-third percentage points. 
To determine whether an incomes policy affects the slope of the 
short-run Phillips curve, a dummy variable which interacts with the 
difference between the actual and natural unemployment rates (UNEMRD!) 
is included. The variable GUIDPSUNEMRDl takes into account the effects 
of the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts on the slope of the short-run 
Phillips curve. The coefficient for this variable is not significant, 
indicating that the guideposts did not affect the inflation-unemploy-
ment trade-off. 
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Similarly, the two variables ESP11JNEMRDI and ESP2UNEMRD1 represent 
the two stages of the Nixon controls interacted with UNEMRDl. Neither 
one of these coefficients is statistically significant, indicating that 
the ~ixon program did not affect the inflation-unemployment trade-off. 
The two variables STD1UNE:MRDI and STD2llNEMRDl are constructed in a 
manner similar to that of the three preceding variables. The 
coefficient for STD1UNEMRDI, representing the dummy variable for the 
first part of the Carter program interacted with Ut.JEMRTn, is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient for STD2UNEMRD1, however, 
is statistically significant. The estimated effect of the program is 
1.753 percentage points in the second year, which can be found by 
multiplying the coefficient (1.402) by the average value of UNEMRDI 
( 1.25) during the second year of the program. Tnus, a one percentage 
point increase in UNEMRDI would cause wage inflation to increase by 
1.753 percentage points. As was discussed above, the coefficient for 
the variable UNEMRDI was negative and significant, and implied that the 
slope of the short-run Phillips curve was negative. The positive 
coefficient for the variable ~TD2U~EMRD1 implies that the Phillips 
curve had a positive slope in the second year of the standards. Thus, 
the short-run trade-off between wage inflation and unemployment 
worsened; i.e., an increase in the unemployment rate resulted in 
higher, rather than lower, wage inflation. 
These results conflict with those of Hagens and Russell, who found 
that the standards did not affect the slope of the short-run Phillips 
curve. To test the sensitivity of the results presented here, system 
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(3.14) was re-estimated, with the inflationary expectations variable 
modeled as a third-degree polynomial distributed lag, with the far 
endpoint constrained to zero, the same approach that Hagens and Russell 
used. The lag length was allowed to vary from 11 to 15 quarters. 
The results of this procedure are presented in Table VIII. At the 
.05 significance level rationality cannot be rejected for equations 
(3.15.1) and (3.15.3). These two equations have, respectively, the 
scrne lag lengths as (3. 14.4) and (3. 14. 6) . A comparison of the results 
presented in Table VII and Table Vlll suggests that the use of a 
polynomial distributed lag restriction affects, for a given lag length, 
whether the null hypothesis of rationality can be rejected. For 
exanple, when a lag. length of 12 quarters (equation (3.14.5)) is used 
without the polynomial distributed lag restriction, the null hypothesis 
of rationality cannot be rejected; however, when this same lag length 
(equation (3.15.2)) is used with a polynomial distributed lag 
restriction, the null hypothesis of rationality can be rejected. 
A comparison of equations (3.15.1) and (3.15.3) shows that PC is 
lowest for (3.15.3), which has a lag length of 13 quarters. Thus, our 
discussion will be centered around equation (3.15.3). 
There is a great deal of similarity in the parameter estimates of 
equations (3.14.?) and (3.15.?), despite the fact that they have 
different lag lengths (12 and 13 quarters, respectively), and (3.14.?) 
does not use a polynomial distributed lag restriction while (3.15.3) 
does. 
Tne only striking difference between these two equations is the 
greater size of the parameter estimate for STD2UNEMRDI in equation 
(3.15.3). Returning to equation (3.14.5), the estimated effect of the 
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TABLE VIII 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION F:QUATlONS FOR lNFLATION-lJNEMPLOYMENT 
HYPOTHESIS TEST -- WITH A POLYNOMIAL DISTRIBUTED LAG 
Variable 3.15.1 3. 15.2 3.15.3 3.15.4 3. 15.5 
(11 lags) ( 12 lags) (13 lags) (14 lags) ( 15 lags) 
TR 1. 233* 1.194* 1.242* 1.208* 1.17* 
(.179) (.131) (.196) (.221) (.202) 
IJNEMRDI 
-.273 -.326* -.321* -.409* -.384* (. 151) (.154) (.139) (.166) (.145) 
CHSSTAX .713* .743* .748* .746* .737* 
(.145) (.142) (.135) (.135) (.136) 
CHMINWA .0113 .014* .0124* .0118 .011 
(. 0063) (. 006) ( .0057) (. 006) ( .006) 
DATADUM -1.Q3 -1.926 -1.916 -1.874 -1.888 
( 1 • 136) ( 1. 1) (1.041) (1.071) (1.077) 
~bi 1.679 1.282 1. 41 1. 534 1.561 
GUIDPSUNEMRDI .341 .34 .471 .461 .452 
(. 366) (. 374) (.435) (.425) ( .441) 
ESP1UNEMRD1 
-1.949 -2.199 -2.249 -2.29 -2.047 (1.925) ( 1 . 88')) ( 1. 901) ( 1 . 958) (1.989) 
ESP2UNEMRDI .849 1. 321 1. 61 1. 501 1.603 
(.743) (. 739) (.843) (. 796) (.828) 
STD1UNEMRDI 7.304 5.566 3.889 4.99 4.rJ3 
(5.069) (4.869) (4.525) (4.918) (4. 871) 
STD2UNEMRDI 1. 58* 1. 9* 2.246* 1.988* 2.033* 
(.419) (.563) (.549) ( .561) (.57) 
RH01 .241* . 115 . 15 .165 • 169 
(. 079) (.091) (. 083) (. 086) ( .09) 
RH02 -.05:l -.089 -.08 -.072 -.063 
( .079) ( .091) (. 083) ( .086) (.09) 
RH03 .322* .306* .31* .314* .296* 
(.066) (. 065) (. 062) (. 065) (.065) 
RO 
TABLE Vlll (Continued) 
RH04 .092 .o:;s .084 .081 .091 
(. 065) (. 063) (. 06) (. 064) (. 064) 
Adjusted R2 .6976 .731)1 .7358 .738 .7363 
Standard 
Error 1. 3302 1.24? 1.2435 1.2382 1.2424 
q 45 49 53 57 61 
X 2 36.201 71.021 62.66 80.585 81.722 
Critical x2 61.653 66.336 70.991 75.622 80.23 
PC 2.0265 1.771 
Tne dependent variable is C. The sample period is 1954:2 through 
1983:2; standard eerrors are shown in parentheses. 
The variable CPIL is lagged using a third-degree polynomial 
distributed lag, with the far endpoint constrained to zero. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
A1 
seoond year of the Carter program was shown to be 1.7?3 percentage 
points, which was found by multiplying the coefficient (1.402) by the 
average value of UNEMRDI (1.2S) during the second year of the program. 
In equation (3.1?.3), the coefficient for the second year of the 
program is 2.246. When this is multiplied by the value of IJNF:MRDI, the 
estimated effect of the second year of the program is 2.808 percentage 
points, which implies that a one percentage point increase in IJNEMRDI 
~uld cause wage inflation to increase by 2.808 percentage points. 
This result implies that the standards caused a perverse impact on the 
short-run inflation-unemployment trade-off. 
The results presented above do not agree with those of Hagens and 
Russell, who found that the Carter standards did not affect the slope 
of the short-run Phillips curve. Thus, in both hypotheses tested so 
far, the results found here have conflicted with those of Hagens and 
Russell. With this in mind, we now turn to the third hypothesis tested 
by Hagens and Russell, the impact of tne Carter standards on infla-
tionary expectations. 
Rational Expectations and the Deflation 
of Inflationary Expectations 
Using the adaptive expectations approach, Hagens and Russell con-
eluded that the standards lowered inflationary expectations, and there-
by directly lowered wage inflation during each of the two phases of the 
Carter program. This same hypothesis will now be tested using the 
rational expectations approach. Equation (3.9), the price inflation 
expectations equation estimated above, will be used in the following 
analysis. However, a different set of wage equations will be estimated. 
The Wage Inflation Equations 
To test the effects of incomes policies on inflationary expecta-
tions, each of tne five dummy variables included in the constrained 
wage equation to represent incomes policies or their phases must be 
interacted with the polynomial distributed lag on expected price 
inflation. 13 
The constrained system takes the form 
C = ct 1TR + d2U~EMRD1 + d3CHSSTAX 
+ ct4CHMINWA + d5DATADUM 
N e 
+ I: b 1 . CPILt . i=O 1 -1 
N e 
+ L b2 . ( CPlLt . • GUIDPS) i=O 1 -1 
N e 
+ ~ b3.(CP!Lt. ESP1) 
. 0 1 -1 1= 
N e 
+ L' b4 . (CPILt . ESP2) 
. 0 1 -1 1= 
N e 
+ I: bt.:. (CPILt . STD1) 
. 0 :.;1 -1 1= 
~ e 
+ L b6 . (CPILt . STD2) + et' 
. 0 1 -1 1= 
e 
and CP!Lt = s1CONSTANT 
+ s2M1L1 + g3DUM1 
+ s4CPIL1 + g5RUDL1. 
(3. 16) 
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Unfortunately, in this case, ti1e null hypothesis of rationality 
cannot be tested when the lag length exceeds 4 quarters since an 
unconstrained wage equation cannot be estimated _for a longer lag 
length. As an example, suppose that CPILe is lagged ? quarters, from 
i=O to i=4. Thus, in the unconstrained wage equation, the term 
N e 
L b .. CPILt . i=O Jl -1 
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would be replaced by 20 variables (ignoring the constant); each of the 
four variables in CPILe for the periods i=O, i=1, i=2, i=3, and i=4. 
Each of these 20 variables would then need to be interacted with the 5 
incomes policies dummy variables included in the wage equation. This 
alone would account for 120 variables, and since there are only 117 
observations, this equation could not be estimated. 
The results of the constrained wage equation regressions are 
presented in Table IX. The variable CPILe is lagged from quarter t 
to t-11 in equation (3.16.1), from quarter t to t-12 in equation 
(3.16.2), and so on. While the sum of toe coefficients of CPILe and 
the coefficients for TR, UNEMROI, CHSSTAX, CHMINWA, and DATADUM are 
reasonably stable across these four equations, the coefficients for the 
dummy variables (representing the incomes policies) that are interacted 
with the distributed lag on expected price inflation are highly vari-
able. For example, when the lag length being used increases from 12 to 
13 quarters, the coefficient for the first part of the Nixon program 
interacted with the distributed lag becomes almost 4 times as large, and 
the coefficient for the first part of the Carter program interacted with 
the distributed lag becomes over 7 times as large. 
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TABLE IX 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION F:QUATlONS F'OR INFLATIONARY 
EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS 
Variable 3. 16. 1 3.16.2 3. 16. 3 3.16.4 ( 12 lags) (13 lags) (14 lags) ( 1f:> lags) 
TR 1 .264* 1.12* 1 .231 * 1.182* 
(.184) (.2) (.2) (.231) 
UNEMRDI -.28* -.312* -.3:>4* -.334 
(. 13')) (.141) (.1')6) (.166) 
CHSSTAX .649* .:>8* .602* .5r:i2* 
(.14F3) (.157) (.1')) (.144) 
CHMINWA .0121* .0116* .0108 .008 
( .0059) ( .0058) (.0056) (. 006) 
DATADUM -1.7:>3 -1.9~1) -1.668 -2 .26* 
(1.093) ( 1 . 09) (1.064) (1.088) 
GUIDPS . -.597 -.78':) .398 2.404 
I CPILe 
ESP1 
~CPILe 3.316 11.938 
7.58 9.':)49 
ESP2 • 
~CPILe . 176 -. 13 -.551 
-1.232 
STD1 
~ CPIL e -.25 
-1.841 -2.9':)2 -4.5 
STD2 • -.534 -.893 -1.567 -1.044 ~ CPILe 
~bi 1.412 1 . ')2') 1. ')14 1. 778 
RH01 1. 51 . 17* .188 .258* 
(. 092) ( .08) (.096) ( .076) 
RH02 -.064 -.07 -.067 -.054 
( .065) (.064) (. 067) (.066) 
RH03 .274* .272* .2':i5* .241* 
( .064) (. 063) (. 063) (. 065) 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
RHO 4 .066 .0~8 .067 .076 
(.061) (. 0':>9) (.062) ( .06) 
Adjusted R2 .7273 .7482 .7473 .757 
Standard 
Error 1.2633 1. 214 1. 216 1.193 
PC 1.9641 1 • 8133 1.R19R 1. 753 
The dependent variable is C. The sample period is 1954:2 through 
1983:2; standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
8S 
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In equation (3.16.4) (which has the lowest PC), the estimated 
coefficient of the interacted Kennedy-Johnson guidepost variable 
implies that this program increased inflation expectations by 240 per-
cent. Since inflation expectations over this period averaged 3.333 
percent, this translates into a direct effect on wage inflation of 
8.013 percent. 
Turning to the Nixon program, the estimated coefficients imply 
that the first part of the program raised inflation expectations by 9~~ 
percent, while the second part of the program lowered inflation 
expectations by 123 percent.' As inflation expectations averaged 7.926 
and ?.705 percent, respectively, over these two periods, the direct 
effects on wage inflation averaged 7~.68~ percent and -9.493 percent 
during these periods. 
The estimated coefficients of the interacted Carter standards 
variables imply that inflation expectations were lowered by 4~0 and 104 
percent, respectively, during the two parts of this program. With 
inflation expectations averaging 12.43 and 15.631 percent, respec-
tively, this translates into a direct effect on wage inflation of 
-55.935 percent in the first year and -16.31Q percent in the second 
year of the program. 
Admittedly, some of the estimates just presented seem much 
greater in magnitude than what would be theoretically expected and do 
not make sense. It must be reiterated, however, that the null 
hypothesis of rationality cannot be tested in the equations of Table IX; 
therefore it is possible that the null hypothesis could be rejected for 
equation ( 3. 16.4) , but could not be rejected for, say, equation 
(3.16.1), whose interacted income policies dummy variables coefficients 
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~uld generally imply that the r,olicies had .:rnaller (in absolute terms) 
effects on inflation expectations, anJ smaller (in absolute terms) 
effects on the rate of wage inflation. 
With regard to the Carter program, the qualitative estimates 
presented directly above are in agreement with those of Hagens and 
Russell, who found that the standards diJ reduce inflationary 
expectations, which caused a reduction in the rate of wage inflation. 
Rational F.xpectations and the Insulation of 
the Economy from Price Shocks 
Hagens and Russell claimed that the main effect of the Carter 
program was its prevention of tne 1979-80 energy-price explosion from 
being fully passed through to wages. Whether the Carter program 
actually insulated the economy from the price shocks may now be tested 
under the assumption of rational expectations. Before any estimations 
of effectiveness can be undertaken, however, several adjustments must 
be made in the econometric methodology described earlier in this 
chapter. 
We will begin by using equation (2.8) in conjunction with rational 
expectations and lagged expectational variables. This equation will be 
modified, however, to include the data collected for this study rather 
than the Hagens and Russell data whenever the two data sets differ. 1 ~ 
Thus, equation (2.8), appropriately modified for the rational expecta-
tions franework, becomes 
C = d1TR + d2UNEMRDI + d3CHSSTAX 
+ d4CHMINWA + d5DATADUM 
+ d6GUIDPS + d7ESP1 + d8ESP2 
(3. 17) 
n .e n .e 
+ X: s 1 . Et . + I: s2 . Nt . i=O 1 -1 i:O 1 -1 
where the terms with a ~ in them are estimated as variable length 
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polynomial lag functions with their far endpoints constrained to zero, 
.e 
Et . 
-1 is the expected energy price inflation rate in periodt-i' and 
.e 
Nt . 
-1 is the expected non-energy price inflation rate in periodt-i• 
To use equation ( 3.17) in conjunction with rational expectations 
and lagged expectational variables, separate expectational equations 
must be estimated for energy price inflation and non-energy price 
inflation. 
The basic expectations equation used so far has been based on 
equation (3.2) 
(3.2) 
Modifying this equation to represent the general form of price 
inflation expectations, we get 
e 
CP!Lt = CP!Lt_1d + Ft_1h, (3. 18) 
where Zt_1 has been separated into price (CPIL) and non-price (F) 
variables (both which include information known at t-1, t-2, t-3, 
etc.), and d and hare both vectors of coefficients • 
. 
Using the identity CPILt = b0Et + (1-h0)Nt' where b0 is the 
relative importance of energy prices in the Consumer Price Index, 
equation (3.18) becomes 
e 
CPI ::: t 
. 
bo[Et-1j + Ft-1hal 
+ (1-bO)[Nt-1q + Ft-1hbl, 
where j, q, ha, and ~ are vectors of coefficients. 
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(3.19) 
Since there is no reason to assume tnat expectations about energy 
and non-energy price inflation are formed in the same way, separate 
.e .e 
equations w:>uld have to be estimated for Et and Nt. Thus, if 
.e m m .e m m 
Et = ~ Et . j. + ~ Ft . h i, and if Nt = i=O -1 1 i=O -1 a L Nt .q. + £ Ft .hb., i:O -1 1 i:O -1 1 
the constrained system of 3 equations to be estimated becomes 
.e m m 
Et = l: Et .j. + :L Ft .n . + at (3.20) 
i:::O -1 1 i:O -1 81 
.e m m 
Nt = :I: Nt .q. + .L Ft-i~i + ut i=O -1 1 i:O 
ct = d1TR + d2UNEMRDI + d3CHSSTAX + d4CHMINWA 
+ d5DATADUM + d6GUIDPS + d7 ESP1 + d8ESP2 
n .e .e 
+ ~ d9 .rEt .b0 + (1-b0)Nt .1 
. 0 1 -1 -1 1= 
· where at and ut are error terms which separately may be serially 
correlated but are both assumed to be uncorrelated with their 
respective right-hand-side variables, and 
Since this is a three-equation system, Mishkin's procedure, which 
constrained the covariances between disturbances in a two-equation 
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model to be zero, will not be used here. Rather, ~ will proceed under 
the alternative assumption that the covariances between disturbances are 
not constrained to be zero. We begin by estimating the energy and non-
energy expected price inflation equations. 
The Energy and Non-energy Inflation Forecasting Equations 
The optimal forecasts for energy and non-energy price inflation 
are developed hy using the procedure used earlier to forecast the 
overall price inflation rate. Tables X and XI contain the parameter 
estimates of the expected non-energy and energy price inflation 
equations, respectively. 
The dependent variable in equation (3.21), the non-energy price 
inflation expectations equation, is the annualized percentage change in 
the non-energy price index (N). The independent variables are listed 
and defined in Table IV. 
Using the M1 definition of the money supply, the results indicate 
that increases in the growth rate of the money supply increase the 
expected non-energy price inflation rate. Equation (3.21) shows that a 
one percent increase in M1 in period t-1 (M1L1) results in an increase 
in the expected· non-energy price inflation rate in period t of .295 
percent. Looking back at equation (3.9), the expected price inflation 
equation, we see that a one percent change in M1 in period t-1 has an 
almost identical effect on price inflation in period t (.294 percent) 
as it does on non-energy price inflation in period t (.295 percent). 
Variable DUM1, which corrects for the effects of linking different M1 
data series, is insignificant. 
TARLE X 
EXPECTED NON-ENERGY PRICE INFLATION EQUATION 
Variable 3.21 
Constant -.077 
( . 323) 
M1L1 .29:>* 
( • 01) 3) 
DUM1 1 . 921) 
(1.R49) 
BUDL1 .018* 
( . 006) 
CHNON1 .762* 
( . 048) 
Adjusted R2 .71)3 
Standard Error 1. 814 
Durbin h -1.41)34 
The dependent variable is N. 
The sample period is 19:>4:2 through 1983:2; standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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TABLF. XI 
EXPECTED ENERGY PRier;: ITI!FLATION F.QUATIO!Il 
Variable 3.22 
Constant -2.64 
( 1 . 7':>) 
CHCRUDP1 -.29~* 
(. 079) 
CHCRUDM1 -.0266* 
(.013) 
CHCRUDM2 -.041* 
(.014) 
CHPROF1 .046* 
(.01fj) 
M1L1 -.076 
( .273) 
M1L2 .939* 
( .285) 
DUM1 -2.424 
CR. 971) 
DUM2 3.221 
(8.893) 
CHELSAL 1 .092 
( .049) 
CHELSAL2 .182* 
(.053) 
CHECPI1 .476* 
( .079) 
Adjusted R2 .505 
Standard Error B.6R9 
Durbin h -.1573 
TARLE XI (Continued) 
The sample period is 1954:2 through 19R3:2; standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. 
The dependent variable is E. 
*Significant at the ~ percent level. 
93 
94 
BUDL1 is the budget surplus for all levels of U.S. government in 
·period t-1. Interpretation of the estimated coefficient of this vari-
able ~plies that a $100 billion dollar budget surplus results in an 
increase in the expected non-energy price inflation rate in period t of 
1.8 percent. 
The variable CHNON1 represents tne non-energy price inflation rate 
in period t-1. Tne estimated coefficient implies that a one percent 
increase in non-energy price inflation in period t-1 results in a .762 
percent increase in non-energy price inflation in period t. 
Equation (3.22), shown in Table XI, was estimated to measure 
energy price inflation expectations. The dependent variable for this 
equation is the annualized percentage change in the energy price index 
. 
(E). The independent variables are listed and defined in Table IV. 
The variable CHCRUDP1 represents the annualized percentage change 
in U.S. crude oil production in period t-1. Tne estimated coefficient 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in crude oil production 
results in a .295 percentage point decrease in the rate of energy price 
inflation. 
The two variables CHCRUDM1 and CHCRUDM2 represent the annualized 
percentage change in U.S. crude oil imports in periods t-1 and t-2, 
respectively. The estimated coefficients indicate that a 10 percentage 
point increase in crude oil imports in period t-2 would cause a .~1 
percentage point decrease in the rate of energy price inflation in 
period t; whereas, a 10 percentage point increase in crude oil imports 
in period t-1 would cause a .266 percentage point decrease in the rate 
of energy price inflation in period t. 
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Increases in after-tax profits from petroleum refining tended to 
increase the rate of energy price inflation, as is shown by the 
estimated coefficient of the variable CHPROF1. Tnis variable 
represents the annualized percentage change in after-tax profits from 
petroleum refining in period t-1, and the estimated coefficient implies 
that a 10 percentage point increase in petroleum refining profits in 
period t-1 resulted in a .46 percentage point increase in the rate of 
energy price inflation. 
Using the M1 definition of the money supply, the results indicate 
that, for the most part, increases in the growth rate of the money 
supply take longer to affect the rate of energy price inflation than 
the rate of non-energy price inflation. Increases in M1 in period t-1 
{M1L1) significantly affected the non-energy price inflation rate in 
period t; however, these same increases in M1 in period t-1 did not 
significantly affect the energy price inflation rate in period t. On 
the other hand, increases in M1 in period t-2 did significantly affect 
the rate of energy price inflation in period t, while increases in M1 
in periods earlier than t-1 did not affect the rate of non-energy price 
inflation in period t (and consequently, were not included in equation 
(3.21)). The estimated coefficient of M1L2 in equation (3.22) 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in M1 in period t-2 
results in a .939 percentage point increase in the rate of energy price 
inflation in period t. 
The two variables DUM1 and DUM2 are dummy variables that correct 
for the effects of linking different M1 data series. The change from 
old M1 to new M1 occurred in 1959:1. Consequently, an error is 
introduced into the calculation of M1L1 for 1959:2, and an error is 
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introduced into the calculation of M1L2 for 19~9:3. To compensate, 
dummy variables DUM1 and DUM2 are introduced. These dummy variables are 
insignificant. 
The two variables CHF.LSAL1 and CHELSAL2 represent the annualized 
percentage rate of change in electricity sales to ultimate consumers in 
periods t-1 and t-2, respectively. Tne coefficient for CHELSAL1 is not 
significant. Tne coefficient for CHELSAL2 is significant and implies 
that a ten percentage point increase in electricity sales results in a 
1.82 percentage point increase in the rate of energy price inflation. 
CHECPI1 represents the annualized percentage rate of increase in 
energy price inflation in period t-1. Interpretation of the estimated 
coefficient of this variable implies that a one percentage point 
increase in energy price inflation in period t-1 results in a .476 
percentage point increase in energy price inflation in period t. 
The Wage Inflation Equation 
After estimation of the non-energy and energy price inflation 
expectations equations, system (3.20) (see above) can be estimated. 
The results of the estimated wage equation that tests the hypothesis 
that the Carter standards prevented the full pass-through of the energy 
price explosion to wage inflation are presented in Table XII. 
The expected rates of non-energy and energy price inflation are 
lagged from period t to t-11 in equation (3.23.1), from t to t-12 in 
equation (3.23.2), and so on. Since these were the lag lengths for 
price inflation that seemed to generate the best results (i.e., the 
null hypothesis of rationality was not rejected as often for these lag 
lengths as for other lag lengths), they were used here under the 
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TARLE XII 
CONSTRAINED WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS FOR ENERGY PRICE SHOCK 
INSULATION HYPOTHESIS 
Variable 3.23.1 3.2~.2 3.23.3 3.23.4 
( 12 lags) (13 lags) (14 lags) ( 15 lags) 
TR 1.108 1.076 1 . 031) . 1.029 
(.717) ( .751) ( .669) (.614) 
UNEMRDI 
-. 391 -.432 -.426 -.418 
(. 6S3) (.347) (.~87) ( .571) 
CHSSTAX .725 .731 .746 .742 
(. 532) (.~28) (.1)48) (.551) 
CHMINWA .001 .ow .009 .009 
(.02S) (. 025) (. 025) ( .025) 
DATADUM -2.27 -2.246 -1.918 -1.962 
(4.477) (4.433) (4.576) (4.605) 
GUIDPS -1.208 -1.227 -.979 -.984 
(2.131) (2.21)4) (1.928) (1.738) 
ESP1 .299 .247 .043 .046 
(3. 01) (3.13) (2.828) (2.656) 
ESP2 -1.34 -1.32 -1.1)1') -1.501 
(3.284) (3. 375) (3.0?9) (2. 89) 
.e 
~fEt-ibO 1.243 1.28? 1.14 1.18 
.e 
+ <1-bo)Nt-i J 
.e 
~[Et-i . -.194 -.189 -. 173 -. 17 
(Dt)] 
RH01 • 173 .18? .0?6 .079 
(.397) (. 4) (. 39) ( .37) 
RH02 -. 156* -. 156* -. 157* -. 11)69* 
( .01)5) ( .0??) ( .05?) ( .05?5) 
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TARLE XII (Continued) 
RH03 .313* .313* .313* .313* 
( .06) (.06) ( .06) ( .06) 
RH04 -.049 -.049 -.01)1 -.051 
(. 0?1) ( .0?1) (. 01)2) ( .052) 
Adjusted R2 .7082 .7106 .7178 .7167 
Standard 
Error 1. 3067 1. 3014 1.281)2 1.2876 
PC 1.9701 1. 9542 1.9057 1. 9129 
Tne dependent variable is C. 
The sample period is 191)4:2 through 1983:2; standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. 
*Signifioant at the I) peroent level. 
Q9 
assumption of rationality, which could not be tested for system (3.20). 
Since equation (3.23.3) had the lowest PC, the following discussion 
will concentrate on the results from that equation. Note that this 
equation was estimated using a 14 quarter Almon distributed lag. 
One apparent problem with the estimates of the coefficients of the 
variables in equation (3.23.3) (as well as with the other equations in 
Table XII) is that none of the coefficients, with the exception of 
some of the RHO coefficients, are significantly different from zero. 
However, the size of most of the coefficients seems somewhat reason-
able, based on the theoretical and/or empirical evidence presented 
earlier in this paper. For example, the coefficient for TR, the trend 
productivity variable, is 1.03~ in equation (3.23.3), which almost 
exactly equals its theoretically expected value of one. 
Other comparisons can he made, but the main concern is over 
whether the Carter standards prevented the energy price shock from 
getting passed through to wage inflation. The coefficient of 
.e 
~ [Et . 
-1 
(Dt)] (the rate of energy inflation interacted with a 
dummy variable representing the period of the energy price shock) is 
negative and is greater, in absolute terms, than the relative 
importance of energy prices in the CPI (approximately 9.6 percent) 
during this period. This indicates that the Carter standards did 
prevent the roughly concurrent 1979-80 energy price shock from getting 
passed through to wages. This conclusion is in agreement with that of 
Hagens and Russell, despite their adaptive approach to modeling 
expectations and their apparent specification errors. 
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The Effects of Different Data Sets 
The final question to be addressed is to what extent the 
differences in data used in this study and the data used in the Hagens 
and Russell study affected the estimated coefficients. ln response to 
this question, equation (2.8), which is Hagens and Russell's equation 
(1.7) with the specification errors corrected, was re-estimated using 
the author's data, and is presented as equation (3.24) in Table Xlll. 
Equation (2.8) is reproduced for the reader's convenience in Table 
XIII. 
There are three variables in these two equations for which the 
data differed. There is virtually no difference in the estimated 
coefficients of the trend productivity variable, and the coefficients 
of the variables representing the difference between the unemployment 
rate and natural unemployment rate differ by only 0.0~~. However, the 
coefficients of the annualized percentage rate of change in social 
security taxes differed by 0.317, or about 30 percent. lt should be 
noted that the differences in data did not affect the significance of 
the coefficients for any of these three variables. 
On the other hand, the data used for the annualized percentage 
rate of change in the minimum wage were the same in these two equations, 
but the coefficient is significantly different from zero when the other 
Hagens and Russell data are used and it is not significantly different 
from zero when the author's data are used. 
Two other results deserve mentioning. First, when the author's 
data are used, the coefficients for DATADUM, GlJlDPS, ESP1, and ESP2 are 
all larger (in absolute terms) than when Hagens and Russell's data are 
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TARLE XIII 
ADAPTlVE EXPECTATIONS WAGE EQUATIONS ESTIMATED 
WITH DIFF~RENT DATA SETS 
Author's 
Variable 
Hagens and Russell's Equation (2.8) (where 
Variable Coefficients different) 
R 1.161* TR 
(16.231) 
U-U -0.~92* UNEMRDI 
DATADUM 
HRCHSSTAX 
CHMINWA 
GUIDPS 
ESP1 
ESP2 
. 
L(Et .) 
-1 
a • 
L(Nt .) 
-1 
Adjusted R2 
. (-7 .046) 
-1.381 
(-1.502) 
1.038* 
(8.239) 
0.021* 
(4.2!+) 
-0.625* 
(-2.482) 
0.4') 
(0.976) 
-0.616 
(-1 .27) 
0.007 
(1.069) 
0.88* 
(24.954) 
-0. 121 * 
(-7.213) 
0.982 
CHSSTAX 
Equation (3.24) 
Coefficients 
1.168* 
(13.457) 
-0.1)37* 
(-!+.989) 
-1.6')!+ 
(-1.407) 
0.721* 
( !t .651) 
0.007 
(1.157) 
-0.672* 
(-2.08')) 
o.Ro 
( 1. 35) 
-0.957 
(-1.557) 
-0.002 
(-0.206) 
0.902* 
(20.025) 
-0.14* 
(-6.489) 
0.97 
Standard Error 
Durbin-Watson 
TABLE Xlll (Continued) 
O.R89 
1.698 
1.136 
1.9?4 
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The sample period is 1954:2 through 1983:2; t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. Hagens and Russell's dependent variable is W, the 
dependent variable in the author's equation is C. 
L( ) connotes a third-degree polynomial distributed lag, with the far 
endpoint constrained to zero. The lag length is 12 quarters, starting 
with the variable lagged 1 quarter. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
aHagens and Russell did not include a non-energy price inflation 
variable in their misspeoified equation (1.7), this variable is the 
author's and not Hagens and Russell's. 
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used. The statistical significance (or lack of) for these coefficients 
was not affected by the data differences. Second, when the author's 
data are used, there is very little effect on the size of the 
coefficients for the energy and non-energy price inflation variables, 
or their statistical significance (or lack of). However, the sign of 
the coefficient for the annualized rate of change of energy prices 
(which is very small) changes from positive to negative (but remains 
statistically insignificant) when the author's data are used in place 
of Hagens and Russell's. 
Thus, the data differences had no effect on the hypothesis being 
tested; i.e., regardless of the data set being used in the adaptive 
expectations model, the Carter standards prevented the energy price 
shock from getting passed through to wages, as is shown by the negative 
. 
coefficient for L(Et-i)Dt. 
Conclusion 
Wnile the econometric results presented here are only in partial 
agreement with those of Hagens and Russell, these results do tend to 
confirm what Hagens and Russell labeled as their principal conclusion; 
i.e., for-one reason or another, the energy price shock of 1979-80 was 
not passed through to wages in the usual manner. There may have been 
factors other than the Carter standards, however, that caused this 
result. Casual observation suggests that there was a simultaneous 
reduction in the wage inflation rate in other countries during the 
1979-80 period. Was this simply a common response to this inter-
national price shock, or was it due to some fundamental structural 
change that took place during this period? If this was a common 
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response, to what extent was this the result of the Carter standards? 
Questions like this are beyond the scope of this paper. What we have 
shown here is that, using two alternative expectations hypotheses, the 
hypothesis that the Carter standards prevented the energy price shock 
from getting passed through to wage inflation could not be rejected. 
Will this conclusion receive the same level of support at the industry 
level as it has at the aggregate level? That is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
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12The estimates for the trend rate of productivity used here 
differ from those used by Hagens and Russell. They estimate that trend 
productivity during the first part of the Carter program was 1.32 
percent, and 1.26 percent during the second part. These differences 
may be due to several factors. First, the data used here are more 
recent than Hagens and Russell's. Second, the period of estimation is 
different. Hagens and Russell estimate trend productivity from 1953:1 
to 1980:3; whereas, the estimation period used here is 1953:1 to 
1983:4. Third, Hagens and Russell estimated trend productivity by 
regressing the percentage change in productivity on CHGAP (defined as 
the annualized percentage change in ((Potential GNP- Actual 
GNP)/Potential GNP) x 100, CHGAP_1, TIME, and DEOE, and using fitted 
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values setting CHGAP, CHGAP_ 1, and DEOE equal to zero. Alternatively, 
in this study trend productivity is estimated based more on Gordon's 
(1979) original specification; i.e., the percentage change in 
productivity is regressed on CHQ (defined as the annualized percentage 
change in (Actual GNP/Natural GNP), CHQ_1, CHQ_2 , TIME, and DEOE, and 
using the fitted values setting CHQ, CH0_1, CHQ_2, and DEOE equal to 
zero. Their estimates of Potential GNP are supplied by the Council on 
Economic Advisors; the estimates of Natural GNP used here are supplied 
by Robert Gordon (1984). Finally, one of the explanatory variables 
used in the estimation of trend rate of productivity growth, the end-
of-expansion dummy as originally described by Gordon (1Q79), was 
specified in a slightly different way here than it was in Hagens and 
Russell, although it is not clear exactly how they specified their 
dummy. According to Gordon, employers engage in overhiring beginning 
in the quarter after the quarter when the ratio of real GNP(Q).to 
natural real GNP(Q*) reaches its peak. Since managers eventually 
recognize that this overhiring has occurred and take corrective action, 
the dummy variable is constructed to take on positive values for M 
quarters following the quarter when Q/0* reaches its peak, and to take 
on negative values for ~quarters thereafter. The variable is 
constrained to sum to zero over any given business cycle. An 
additional constraint is imposed by setting the values of ~ and N equal 
to the same number for each cycle. Gordon identifies five Q/Q* peaks 
between 1954 and 1979, these occurred in 19~5:4, 1959:2, 1968:3, 
1973:1, and 1978:4. Gordon set M equal to 6 and N equal to 8 for the 
last 4 cycles identified, and set M equal to 4 quarters and N equal to 
6 quarters for the period that began with the Q/Q* peak in 1955:4, thus 
violating his constraint of always having M and N equal to the same 
number for each cycle. The larger value of N reflects the tendency of 
firms to take their corrective action over a longer period than the 
tllne taken for their overstaffing to occur. 
The period of estimation used in this study includes years before 
1954 and after 1979, however. Thus, two additional peak quarters were 
identified, 1953:2 and 1981:1. Given Gordon's own use of a shorter lag 
after the 1955:4 peak, and the fact that M and N could not sum to 14 
quarters after either the 1953:2, 1978:4, or 1Q81:1 peak (given that 
the estimation period ended in 1983:4), the exceptions to the 14 
quarter lag would outnumber the rule. Thus, M and N were constrained 
here to be equal to the same number for each cycle by taking the 
shortest peak to peak period, 1978:4 to 1981:1, a total of nine 
quarters, and, in staying with Gordon's argument that M<N, assigning M 
a length of 4 quarters and N a length of 5 quarters. For example, the 
dummy variable is defined as one-fourth for the first four quarters 
following each peak and as minus one-fifth for the subsequent five 
quarters. 
13Attempts to estimate constrained wage equations without using a 
polynomial distributed lag restriction caused the computer program (SAS) 
to set some of the parameters to constants. This appeared to be caused 
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by the large number of parameters that would have to be estimated, 
since changes in the lag length being used changed the parameters and 
the number of parameters that were being set to constants. 
14All previous work done in this chapter used the data collected 
for this study rather than the Hagens and Russell data whenever the two 
data sets differed. 
CHAPTER IV 
ASSESSING THE EPFECTlVENESS OF THE CARTER 
STANDARDS AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL 
Introduction 
All previous empirical studies of the effectiveness of the Carter 
standards have concentrated on the impact of the standards at the 
aggregate level. In the last chapter it was argued that the main 
effect of the standards at the aggregate level was their prevention of 
the 1979-80 energy price shock from getting passed through to wages in 
the usual manner. In this chapter we will empirically investigate 
whether the standards prevented the energy price shock from passing 
through to wages at the industry level. A conclusion that the 
standards were successful in preventing the price shock from getting 
passed through to wages \-K>uld lend additional support to the notion 
that the Carter standards provided the economy with some real benefits, 
while a conclusion that the standards were not successful at the 
industry level would leave the question of the effectiveness of the 
standards in preventing the pass through of the energy price shock 
unanswered. 
Data Availability and the Selection of Industries 
Tne initial decision that had to be made was which 2-digit SIC 
industries would be used in investigating the extent to which the 
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Carter standards prevented the pass through of the 1979-80 energy price 
shock to wages at the industry level. The availability of data was the 
main factor in determining which of the major industry groups may be 
analyzed. 
In the previous chapter, system (3.20) was estimated to determine 
if the Carter standards were successful in preventing the pass through 
of the 1979-80 energy price shock to wages in the usual manner. 
Ignoring the non-energy and energy inflation forecasting equations, as 
well as the error terms of system (3.20), we have the wage inflation 
equation 
Ct = d1TR + d2UNF.MRDI + d3CHSSTAX (4 .1) 
+ d4CHMINWA + d5GUIDPS + d6ESP1 + d7ESP2 
The difference between the actual unemployment rate and Gordon's 
natural unemployment rate ( !JNEMRDI) is one of the explanatory variables 
included in the above wage inflation equation. In the wage equations 
that are estimated in this chapter, that particular variable is 
replaced by IUNEMRDI, which represents the difference between an 
industry's unemployment rate and Gordon's natural unemployment rate. 
This variable imposes a limit of fifteen industry wage inflation 
equations that can be estimated, since the government has consistently 
reported the unemployment rate by major industry group for only 
fifteen 2-digit manufacturing industries. Furthermore, the period of 
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time over which these equations can he estimated is more limited at the 
industry level than it is at the aggregate level because all industry 
unemployment rates reported before 1g66 were based on data for persons 
14 years of age and older, whereas, the unemployment rates reported for 
1966 and all following years were based on data for persons 16 years of 
age and older. The lJ. S. Department of Labor has not adjusted the 
industry unemployment rates for the earlier years so that these rates 
are consistent with the definition of unemployment for the later time 
period. 
The variable TR in equation (4.1) represents the trend rate of 
productivity growth. In the empirical work in the previous chapter, 
the variable TR was obtained by regressing CHPROD on CHQ, CHQ_1, CH0_2 , 
TIME and DEOE (these variables were defined in Table IV), and using 
the fitted values setting CHQ, CH0_1, CHQ_2 , and DEOE equal to zero. 
One problem that must be dealt with at the industry level is that most 
of the variables needed for estimating trend productivity growth do not 
exist as such and must be generated from other variables. The govern-
ment does not calculate output per man-hour for 2-digit manufacturing 
industries, although the government does calculate this for some 
4-digit manufacturing industries. Therefore, this variable had to be 
created. This was done for each 2-digit industry by dividing each 
quarter's monthly average of the Federal Reserve Board's Industrial 
Production Index (IPI) for that industry by the product of that 
industry's number of employees (L) multiplied by that industry's 
average labor hours per week (AH) for the quarter. Thus, an industry's 
productivity, IP, is equal to IPI/(L*AH). 
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Yne variable CHQ must also be created at the industry lev~l. At 
the aggregate level, CHQ is the annualized percentage change in 
(GNP/NATRGNP) where NATRGNP represents natural real GNP and GNP 
represents real GNP. Gordon's original construction of natural real 
GNP involved the use of an adjusted unemployment rate that was obtained 
by dividing the number of unemployed persons by the civilian labor 
force net of self-employed persons. A similarly adjusted unemployment 
rate for each industry cannot be computed since the number of self-
employed persons in each 2-digit manufacturing industry cannot be 
ascertained. As a result, we chose to compute natural output for each 
industry in a manner similar to how potential GNP is computed. If full 
employment is defined as a ~ percent unemployment rate, for example, 
quarterly potential GNP can be estimated by multiplying 9~ percent of 
the labor force times the average hours of work per quarter (AHO) times 
the average output per man-hour for the quarter (PROD). Substituting 
Gordon's natural unemployment rate (U) for the full employment unemploy-
ment rate with the relevant industry labor force, ILF, industry average 
hours of work for the quarter, QAH, and industry output per man-hour, 
IP, being substituted for their respective corresponding aggregate 
variables gives us what will be called industry natural output (INO). 
Ynus, 
INO = (1-U) * ILF * QAH * IP. 
An industry's actual quarterly output (lAO) can be determined by 
multiplying that industry's employed labor force (which is the 
equivalent of (1-U) for the industry multiplied by the industry's total 
labor force ( ILF)) times the industry's average hours of v.ork for the 
quarter (QAH) times the industry's average output per man-hour (IP). 
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Thus, 
IAO = (1-U) * ILF * QAH * IP. 
Our objective was to find an industry level variable that could be 
substituted for the aggregate level variable Q, which equals (GNP/ 
NATRGNP). What we have derived is TO, wnich is defined as being equal 
to (IAO/INO). Substituting, we find that 
(1-U) * ILF * QAH * IP 1-U 
IQ = = 
(1-U) * ILF * QAH * IP 1-TI 
At the industry level, the variable IQ will be used in place of Q. As 
shown directly above, we can find IQ simply by dividing 1 minus the 
unemployment rate by 1 minus the natural unemployment rate. 
DEOE is the other variable that must be constructed before the 
trend rate of productivity growth can be estimated. At the aggregate 
level, DEOE was defined as one-fourth for the first four quarters 
following each peak of (GNP/NATRGNP) and as minus one-fifth for the 
subsequent five quarters and as zero at all other times. Due to the 
substitution, at the industry level, of the variable IQ for the 
variable Q, DEOE will be replaced by IDEOE, ~1ich will be defined for 
each industry as one-third for the first three quarters following each 
peak in that industry's IQ and as minus one-fourth for the subsequent 
four quarters and as zero for all other times. For each industry, 
there tended to be more peaks in IQ than in the economy's Q, which 
resulted in IDEOE having a non-zero value for just the first seven 
quarters following a peak in IQ; whereas, DEOE had a non-zero value for 
the first nine quarters following a peak in Q. 
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Once an industry's IQ, IDEOE, and its output per man-hour (TP) 
have been calculated, trend productivity can be estimated for that 
industry by regressing the annualized percentage change in output per 
man-hour (CHIP) on the annualized percentage change in IQ (CHIQ), 
its values lagged one quarter (CHIQ_1) and two quarters (CHIQ_2), 
IDEOE, and TIME (where TIME equals 1 for the first quarter trend 
productivity is being estimated for, 2 for the second quarter, and so 
on), and using the fitted values setting CHIQ, CHIQ_1, CHIQ_2 , and 
IDEOE equal to zero. The variable TR is then replaced in equation 
(4.1) by ITR, which represents an industry's trend rate of productivity 
growth. 
The variable C in equation (4.1) represents the annualized per-
centage change in pay, where pay is defined as being the product of the 
hourly earnings index of production workers in the private nonfarm 
sector multiplied by the ratio of aggregate compensation of employees 
to aggregate wages and salaries. At the industry level, the data for 
average hourly earnings excluding overtime (IAHE) are readily available 
on a quarterly basis, as was the case at the aggregate level. Each 
industry's total compensation of employees (IWSS) and total wages and 
salaries (IWS), however, are not available on a quarterly basis, but 
are only available on an annual basis. As a result, the annual data 
were converted into quarterly data by assuming that each industry's 
total employee compensation and total wages and salaries have the same 
quarterly-to-annual ratio as is found in the aggregate data. For 
example, suppose that in the first quarter of some given year the 
aggregate amount of total employee compensation (measured at an annual 
rate) is 98 percent of the total annual employee compensation for that 
year. Thus, each industry's employee compensation for that same 
quarter (measured at annual rate) would be set at 9B percent of the 
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annual amount. This same procedure was used for every quarter of every 
year that required this data. Every method used to convert annual data 
to quarterly data is necessarily ad hoc, and tne procedure used above 
is no exception. Hopefully, the procedure used above does reflect, to 
a large degree, changes that were occurring in the national economy 
that may have been affecting these manufacturing industries. One 
drawback to this procedure, however, is that aggregate employee 
compensation and aggregate wages and salaries may be increasing or 
decreasing at a rate that is faster or slower than the respective 
industry measures. As a result, at the industry level there could be 
some exaggeration of the changes in these two variables, particularly 
between the fourth quarter of any given year and the subsequent first 
quarter. To counteract this problem, the data for these two variables 
were exponentially smoothed, using both light and moderate smoothing. 1 
In the empirical results reported helow, it will be indicated whether 
light or moderate smoothing was being used. The variable C is then 
replaced in equation (4.1) by IC, which represents an industry's 
annualized percentage change in pay. 
The final aggregate variable in equation (4.1) that has to be 
replaced by an industry variable is CHSSTAX, which is the annualized 
percentage change in (1/(1-TWER/WS)) where ~NER represents aggregate 
employer contributions for social insurance, and WS represents 
aggregate wages and salaries. Quarterly data for industry employer 
contributions for social insurance are not available; therefore, this 
variable had to be created for each of the fifteen 2-digit industries. 
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This variable was created for each industry by assuming that the 
proportion of the difference between aggregate compensation of 
employees and aggregate wages and salaries that was accounted for by 
aggregate employer contributions for social insurance is the same for 
each industry as it is at the national level; that is, each industry's 
employer contributions for social insurance (ITWER) is computed from 
the equation (TWER/(WSS-WS)) = (ITWER/(IWSS-IWS)), where IWSS is an 
industry's exponentially smoothed compensation of employees and IWS is 
an industry's exponentially smoothed wages and salaries. Tne variables 
TWER, WSS, WS, IWSS, and IWS are known and the above equation can 
be solved for ITWEn for each quarterly observation in each industry. 
CHSSTAX in equation (4.1) is t:nen replaced by ICHSSTAX, where ICHSSTAX 
is the annualized percentage change in (1/(1-ITWER/IWS)). All vari-
ables used in the empirical analysis in this chapter that have not been 
previously defined are listed and defined in Table XIV. 
C, TR, UNEMRDI, and CHSSTAX were the variables in equation (4.1) 
that had to be replaced by industry level variables to test whether the 
Carter standards prevented the energy price shock of 1979-80 from 
getting passed through to wages in the usual manner at the industry 
level. System (3.20) (equation (4.1) is the wage equation from that 3 
equation system) was estimated to test this energy price shock 
hypothesis at the aggregate level in the previous chapter. Replacing 
the aggregate level variables C, TR, UNEMRDI, and CHSSTAX with their 
corresponding industry level variables IC, ITR, IIJNEMRDI, and ICHSSTAX 
in system (3.20) would result in system 
TARLE XIV 
VARIABLE~ 
Variable Definition 
APP Apparel and other finished products 
made from fabrics and similar 
materials -- SIC 23 
CHEM Chemicals and allied proJucts 
SIC 28 
ELEC Electrical and electronic macn1nery, 
equipment, and supplies -- SIC 36 
FAB Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and transportation equip-
ment -- SIC 34 
FOOD 
FURN 
LUMBER 
MACH 
PAPER 
PRIM 
PRINT 
RUBBER 
STONE 
TEXT 
TRAN 
IUNEMRDI 
Food and kindred products SIC 20 
Furniture and fixtures -- ~nc 2':> 
Lumber and wood products, except 
furniture -- SIC 24 
Machinery, except electrical -- SIC 3!:> 
Paper and allied products -- SIC 26 
Prllnary metal industries -- SIC 33 
Printing, publishing, and allied 
industries -- SIC 27 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics 
products -- SIC 30 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete 
products -- SIC 32 
Textile mill products SIC 22 
Transportation equipment -- SIC 37 
Tne difference between the industry 
unemployment rate (U) and 
Gordon's natural unemployment rate (0) 
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Source 
lJ 
ITR 
TABLE XIV (Continued) 
An industry's unemployment rate 
An industry's estimated trend rate of 
produotivity growth, obtained by re-
gressing CHIP on CHIQ, CHIQ_1 , CHIQ_2 , 
IDEOE, and TIME, and using the fitted 
values setting CHIQ, CHIQ_ 1, CHIQ_2 , 
and IDEOE equal to zero, the period of 
estimation being 1966:4 - 198~:4 
CHIP Annualized percentage change in IP 
IP An industry's output per man-hour, equal 
to (IPI/(L*AH)) 
!PI 
L 
AH 
Industrial Production Index for an 
Industry 
Number of employees for an industry 
Average labor hours per week (during 
a quarter) for an industry 
CHIQ Annualized percentage change in an 
industry's IQ 
1 - tJ 
IQ Equal to 
1 - u 
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1966:1 - 1983:2: 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; 
1983:3 - 1985:3: 
Employment and 
Earnings 
Federal Reserve 
Board 
1966:1 - 19R4:2: 
Employment, Hours, 
and Earnings, U.S. 
1909-84; 
1984:3 - 198?:3: 
Survey of Current 
Business 
1966:1 - 1984:2: 
Em~loyment, Hours, 
an Earnings, U.S. 
1909-84; 
1q84:3 - 19R5:3: 
Survey of Current 
Business 
IDEOE 
TABLE XIV (Continued) 
End-of-expansion dummy, equal to 
one-third for the first three quarters 
following a peak in an industry's 10; 
minus one-fourti'J for the subsequent 
four quarters 
TIME 1 for 1966:4, 2 for 1Q67:1, and so on 
IC An industry's annualized percentage 
change in PAY 
PAY Equal to IAHE * (lWSSIIWS) 
IAHE 
IWSS 
ICHSSTAX 
I'IWER 
An industry's average hourly earnings, 
excluding overtime 
An industry's compensation of employees; 
created by converting annual data to 
quarterly data by methods described in 
the text 
An industry's annualized percentage 
change in (1/(1-ITWER/IWS)) 
An industry's employer contributions 
for social insurance, created by 
assuming ITWER = ((lWSS- IWS) * TWER)/ 
(WSS-WS) 
11 R 
Constructed in 
a manner similar 
to Gordon's 
(1979) original 
specification 
1966: 1 - 19R4: 2: 
Em~loyment, Hours, 
an Earnings, U.S. 
1909-84; 
19B4:3 - 1985:3: 
Survey of Current 
Business 
Survey of Current 
Business 
.e m m 
Et = .~ Et_1. ji + L: Ft . h . + at 1=0 i=O - 1 al 
ICt = d1ITR + d2IUNEMRDI + ct3ICHSSTAX 
+ d4CHMINWA + d~GUIDPS + ct6 E~P1 + d7E~P2 
n .e 
+ 2: dq . Et . ( Dt) + et, 
. 0 1 -1 1= 
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(4.2) 
where at and Ut are error terms which separately may be serially 
correlated but are both assumed to he uncorrelated with their 
respective right-hand-side variables, and 
et = P1et-1 + P2et-2 + P3et-3 + P4et-4' 
Tne first two equations in this system represent the energy and 
non- -ergy inflation forecasting equations, respectively, while the 
third equation represents the wage inflation equation. Note that the 
variable DATADUM, which was included in system (3.20) to correct for 
linking different data series in the aggregate part of this study, is 
no longer necessary and is not included in system (4.2). As noted 
above, a lack of data means the wage inflation equations estimated for 
2-digit industries cannot be estimated over the same time period that 
was used for estimation of the aggregate wage inflation equation. 
Thus, both the non-energy and energy inflation forecasting equations 
originally estimated in system (3.20) have to be re-estimated over 
the time period for which the 2-digit industry wage inflation equations 
will be estimated. 
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Inflation Forecasting ~quations 
Tne optimal forecasts for energy and non-energy price inflation 
are developed by using the procedure used in the previous chapter to 
forecast these components of overall price inflation. Tables XV and 
XVI contain the parameter estimates of toe expected non-energy and 
energy price inflation equations, respectively. All variables included 
in these t'ht> tables were originally defined in Table IV, and retain 
their original meaning in this chapter. Due to differences in data 
availability at the 2-digit industry level, tbe wage equations being 
estimated for the fifteen manufacturing industries will be estimated 
over one of two time periods, either 1967:1 through 1985:3, or 1968:4 
through 1985:3, with the longer time period being used whenever the 
data allows. Due to the wage equations being estimated over two 
different time periods, the non-energy and energy price inflation 
forecasting equations must be estimated over the same two time periods. 
Equation (4.3.1) is estimated over the 1967:1 through 1985:3 time 
period, v.hile equation ( 4. 3. 2) is estimated over the 1968: 4 tnrough 
1985:3 time period. Tne dependent variable in both equations is the 
annualized percentage change in the non-energy component of the 
consl.lller price index. The estimated coefficients are presented in 
Table XV. 
Using the M1 definition of the money supply, the results indicate 
that a one percent increase in M1 in period t-1 (M1L1) results in an 
increase in the expected non-energy price inflation rate in period t of 
.295 and .2Q2 for the longer and shorter time periods, respectively. 
TABLE XV 
EXPECTED NON-ENERGY PRICE INFLATION EQUATIONS 
Variable 4. 3. 1 4.3.2 
Constant .303 .553 
(. 822) ( .9Q) 
M1L1 .29':>* .292* 
(. 072) ( .07FD 
BUDL1 .017* .018* 
(.005) (.005) 
CHNON1 . 729'1f .709* 
(. 077) ( .089) 
Adjusted R2 .636 .614 
Standard Error 1. 87 1.917 
Durbin h -.6637 -.4262 
Tne dependent variable is N. 
Tne sample period is 1967:1 through 1985:3 for equation 4.3.1, 
and 1968:4 through 1985:3 for equation 4.3.2, standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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BUDL1 is the budget surplus for all levels of U.S. government in 
period t-1. Interpretation of the estimated coefficients of this 
variable implies that a $100 billion dollar budget surplus results in 
an increase in the expected non-energy price inflation rate in period t 
of 1.7 and 1.8 percent for the longer and shorter time periods, 
respectively. 
T'ne variable CHNON1 represents past non-energy price inflation 
rates. A one percent increase in the non-energy component of the CPl 
in period t-1 results in an increase in the expected non-energy price 
inflation rate in period t of .729 percent and .709 percent for the 
longer and shorter time periods, respectively. 
Equations ( 4. 4. 1) and ( 4. 4. 2) , shown in Table XVI, were estimated 
to measure energy price inflation expectations for the 1967:1 through 
1985:3 and 1968:4 through 1985:3 time periods, respectively. The 
dependent variable for both equations is the annualized percentage 
change in the energy price index (E). 
T'ne variable CHCRUDP1 represents the annualized percentage change 
in U.S. crude oil production in period t-1. T'ne estimated coefficient 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in crude oil production 
results in a .263 and .363 percentage point decrease in the rate of 
expected energy price inflation in period t for the longer and shorter 
time periods, respectively. 
T'ne two variables CHCRUDM1 and CHCRUDM2 represent the annualized 
percentage change in ll. S. crude oil imports in periods t-1 and t-2, 
respectively. T'ne estimated coefficients for CHCRUD11 indicate that a 
10 percentage point increase in crude oil imports in period t-1 results 
in a .33 percentage point decrease in the rate of expected energy price 
TARLE XVI 
EXPECTED ENERGY PRICE INFLATION EQUATIONS 
Variable 4.4.1 4.4.2 
Constant 6.09~* 6.78~* 
(1.654) (1.819) 
CHCRUDP1 -.263* -.363* 
(.131) (.182) 
CHCRUa-.11 
-.033* -.032 ( .016) (.017) 
CHCRUa-.12 -.049* -.0~6* 
(.018) (.019) 
CHPROF1 .086* .094* 
( . 023) ( .025) 
CHECPI1 .332* .296* 
(.101)) (.111) 
Adjusted R2 .401 .405 
Standard Error 11.427 11 . 81 
Durbin h -.6119 -.7216 
Tne dependent variable is F.:. 
The sanple period is 1967:1 through 1981):3 for equation 4.4.1 
and 1968:4 through 1985:3 for equation 4.4.2, standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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inflation in period t in the longer of the two estimation periods; 
however, changes in crude oil imports in period t-1 did not signifi-
cantly affect the rate of expected energy price inflation in period t 
in the shorter of the two estimation periods. Tne estimated co-
efficients for CHCRUDM2 indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in 
crude oil imports in period t-2 results in a .49 and .56 percentage 
point decrease in the rate of expected energy price inflation in period 
t for the longer and shorter estimation periods, respectively. 
Increases in after-tax profits from petroleum refining tended to 
increase the rate of expected energy price inflation, as is shown by 
the estimated coefficients of the variable CHPROP1. !nis variable 
represents the annualized percentage change in after-tax profits from 
petroleum refining in period t-1, and the estimated coefficients imply 
that a 10 percentage point increase in petroleum refining profits in 
period t-1 resulted in a .86 and .94 percentage point increase in 
period t in the rate of expected energy price inflation for the longer 
and shorter estimation periods, respectively. 
CHECPI1 represents the annualized percentage rate of increase in 
energy price inflation in period t-1. Interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients of CHECPI1 implies that a one percentage point increase in 
energy price inflation in period t-1 results in a .332 and .296 per-
centage point increase in expected energy price inflation in period t 
for the longer and shorter estimation periods, respectively. 
Wage Inflation Equations 
Using non-energy price inflation forecasting equation (4.~) and 
energy price inflation forecasting equation (4.4), the constrained wage 
inflation system is estimated as 
!Ct = d1ITR + d21UNEMRD1 + d3ICHSSTAX 
+ d4CHM1NWA + d5GUIDPS + d6F:SP1 + d7ESP2 
n .e 
+ ,L d" . rEt . ( Dt) 1 + et i:O '11 -1 
.e 
Et -: g1 + g2CHCRUDP1 + g3CHCRUDM1 + g4CHCRUJJ.12 
+ g5CHPROF1 + g6CHECPil, and 
.e 
Nt = h1 + ~M1L1 + h3BUDL1 + h4CHNON1. 
(4.5) 
At the aggregate level, the wage equation that was used to test the 
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hypothesis that the Carter standards prevented the full pass-through of 
the energy price explosion to wage inflation had its lowest PC when the 
expected rates of non-energy and energy price inflation were lagged 
from period t to t-13. Due to this result, the wage equations used to 
test the energy price shock hypothesis at the 2-digit industry level 
are estimated using the same lag length; i.e., from period t to t-13. 
The results of the estimated wage equations for the fifteen 2-digit 
industries being used are presented in Table XVII and Table XVIII. The 
results presented in Table XVII are for the industry wage inflation 
equations where the quarterly data for each industry's total compen-
sation and total wages and salaries (necessary for computing pay and 
the annualized percentage change in pay, which is the dependent 
variable in the wage inflation equations) were created from annual data 
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TARLE XVll 
CONSTRAINED INDUSTRY WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS WHEN 
INDUSTRY COMPENSATION AND WAGES AND SALARIES 
ARE LIGHTLY ~MOOTHF.D 
Variable APPa CI-IF.Ma ELECa FABa FOOD a 
ITR 1 . 11 2.404 1.267 .146 3.f:>B 
(2.B24) (1.7f)3) (1.29f)) (2.647) (1.884) 
IUNEMRDI -.219 1. 338 .493 . 1f)6 1.95f)* 
( .f)18) (. 809) (. 497) ( • 9f)4) (. 799) 
ICHSSTAX .104 -.149 .009 -.041 -.297* 
(.246) (.2C)) (.097) (.219) (.12B) 
CHMINWA .154* .098 .02 .023 .034 
( .Of)2) (.05) ( .048) (.118) ( .05) 
GUIDPS 3.044 283.616* 2.787 .546 1.465 
(11.119) (14.673) (9.814) (5. 479) ( 10.39) 
ESP1 .024 -.883 .Of:>3 36 .297* -1 • 161 
(3. 794) (3.076) (3.268) (6.753) (3.703) 
ESP2 2.926 -3.21 -1.633 -5.649 -.569 
(4.202) (2.85) (3.408) (8.f)12) (3. 659) 
.e 
L.[Et-i bo -.293 .535 .532 .704 .449 
.e 
+ ( 1-b0Nt-i l 
.e 
~ rEt-i . .17 .093 .067 -.115 • 161 
(Dt)] 
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TABLE XVll (Continued) 
RH01 
-.OS2 -.~39* -.105 -. 5* . 10A (.184) ( . 021) ( .267 ( .071) (.176) 
RH02 -.03Q -.083* -.OA7 -.281* -. 136* (.OM) (. 024) (. 068) ( .06) ( .067) 
RH03 . 186* .21* .21* -.039 .213* (. 068) ( .02) (. 069) ( .059) ( .07) 
RH04 .083 1"'* . ' .079 .03 . 137* (. 062) (.009) (. 061) (. 061) (. 061) 
Adjusted R2 .051 .Q69 .236 .166 .552 
Standard Error 5.45 6.R09 3.229 27.229 4.078 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Variable FURNa TRANa LlJMRERa MACiia PAPERb. 
ITR 1.124 3.462 1.636 -1.137 -.634 
(2.44) (3.211) (1.486) (2.43) (1.6?8) 
IUNEMRDI .05 .305 -.337 • 156 -.431 
(. 372) (. 426) (.334) (.61) (. 648) 
ICHSSTAX -.08 -.203 -.058 . 11)2 -.082 
(.186) (.20) (. 084) (. 341) (. 092) 
CHMINWA .026 -.016 .032 -.019 -.06 
(. 046) ( . 0')) (. 052) ( .047) ( .05) 
GUIDPS 3.025 -6. 136 -3.457 -3.493 
(8.882) ( 13. q86) (11.258) ( 10.94) 
ESP1 1. 016 -1.663 -3.512 .329 1.497 
(2.974) (3. 92i) (3.668) (3.419) (2.605) 
ESP2 -.469 -1.588 .261 -1.727 -2.349 
(3. 772) (3. 835) (4.077) (3.669) (2.851) 
.e 
~[Et-ibO .682 1. 521 1.252 1.216 1. 594 
.e 
+ (1-b0)Nt-il 
.e 
LfEt . 
-1 -.063 -. ~~77 -.259 -.315 -.336 
(Dt)] 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
RH01 
-.406* -.194 -.013 -.045 -.56* (.191) (.119) ( .161) (.295) (.189) 
RH02 
-.073 -.077 -.111 -.095 -.071 ( .066) (. 065) ( .067) ( .068) (. 068) 
RH03 .216* .189* • 162* .235* .206* (. 067) (. 064) (. 068) ( .069) ( .068) 
RH04 .071 .122* • 153* .063 .066 ( .06) (. 059) (.061) (.061) (.061) 
Adjusted R2 .148 • 104 • 139 .364 .275 
Standard Error 3.34 6.491 5.372 2.895 3.701 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Variable PRIMa PRlNTa RUBBERb STONE a TEXT a 
ITR -4.39~ 4.202 .289 1.078 -1.~36 
(3.%2) (5.312) (.376) (2. 829) (1.507) 
IUNEMRDI .215 .076 .787 -.1~7 -.957* 
(. 336) (1.01R) ( .61) (.384) (.449) 
ICHSSTAX .148 -.36 -.013 -. 122 .13 ( . 158) (.439) (.124) (. 172) (.172) 
CHMINWA .021 .018 -.024 -.006 .001 
( .047) ( .046) ( .0')5) ( .046) (. 055) 
GUIDPS -6.152 -2.0~9 -2.R55 -2.547 
(10.~03) (g. 106) (8.319) (10.491) 
ESP1 3.88') -.327 -1.715 .311 -1. 134 
(3.835) (3 .223) (4.114) (3 .072) (3.707) 
ESP2 .39R -1.003 -.346 -1.313 1.233 
(3. 761) (3. 062) (4.082) (3.068) (3.924) 
.e 
!:: [Et-i bo 2.269 .769 .6 1.4R4 1.676 
.e 
+ (1-b0)Nt-il 
.e 
L:[Et-i . -.478 .037 -.023 -. 17 -.302 
(Dt)] 
TARLE XVII (Continued) 
R!-101 .003 -. 188 .046 -.247 
(.241)) ( . 36:>) (.176) (.289) 
RH02 -.019 -.081 -. 1 o:; -.078 
( .068) ( .068) (. O?) ( .068) 
RH03 .22* .236* .218* .217* 
( .07) (.069) ( .072) (.068) 
RH04 .065 .06 .062 .073 
(.061) ( .06) ( .064) ( .061) 
Adjusted R2 .528 .3q2 -.052 .39 
Standard Error 3.479 1. 926 5.7 2.914 
T'ne dependent variable is IC. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level • 
. e .e .e 
The variables rEt_.b0 + (1-b0 )Nt_.l and rEt-i(Dt)] are lagged from t to t-13. 1 1 
a b T'ne sanple period is 1967: 1 through 1985:3. 
T'ne sanple period is 1968:4 through 1985:3. 
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-.209 
( . 138) 
-.065 
(. 065) 
• 128* 
( .064) 
.175* 
( .06) 
.175 
6.633 
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TARLE XVIll 
CONSTRAINED INDUSTRY WAGE INFLATION EQUATIONS WHEN 
INDUSTRY COMPENSATION AND WAGES AND SALARIES 
ARE MODERATELY SMOOTHED 
Variable APPa CHEM8 F.LF.C a FAB8 FOOD a 
ITR 2.009 2. 11 R* 1.14 .073 3.482 
(2.~8) (. 981) (1.314' (2.219) (3.0) 
IUNEMRDI -.06 1.113 .388 .426 1.916* 
(.497} (.828) (.504) (.461) (.797) 
ICHSSTAX -.061 -.1')3 .007 -.128 -.287 
(.217) ( • 24 3) (.144) (.147) "(.202) 
CHMINWA .162* .098* .022 .049 .039 
(. 049) (.049) ( .048) (.119) (.05) 
GlJlDPS 4.143 294.333* 3.635 -1.384 1 .692 
(11.052} ( 12.492) (10.495) ( 16.534) (10.984} 
ESP1 -.634 -.996 -. 183 37. 493* -1.329 
(3.704) (3.108) (3.399) (7.038) (3 .641) 
ESP2 3.916 -2.997 -1.595 -6.938 -.494 
(3.9~9) (3.164) (3. 531) (7 .OS6) (3 .6S7) 
.e 
L:fEt-ibO .062 .7S7 .659 .996 .444 
.e 
+ (1-b0)Nt-il 
.e 
:L:[F:t-i . .112 .05 .03S -.153 . 16 
(Dt}l 
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TARLE XVlll (Continued) 
RH01 -.108 -.~29* -.042 -.~49* .091 (.209) (.012) ( .28~) ( .071) (.714) 
RH02 
-.072 -.072* -.085 -.307* -.133* ( .068) ( .02) (. 068) ( .066) ( .067) 
RH03 • 194* .213* .213* -.074 .21 * (.068) (.019) ( .069) ( .066) (. 069) 
RH04 .084 . 171 * .077 .025 . 137* ( .061) (.016) (. 061) ( .061) ( .061) 
Adjusted R2 • 17') .968 .242 .192 .t.h2 
Standard Error 4.548 6.911) 3.033 26.872 4.014 
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TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Variable FURNa TRANa LUMBF.R a ~CHa PAPERb 
ITR 1. 343 2.606 1.586 .324 -.496 
( 1. 175) (3.042) ( 1. 787) (3 .509) (1.46) 
IUNEMRDI .047 .328 -.402 -. 181. -.4')8 
(.33) (.40~) (.325) (. 562) (.546) 
ICHSSTAX 
-.083 -.182 -.053 -.048 0.072 ( . 124) (.172) (.109) (.431) (.102) 
CHMlNWA .031 -.024 .043 -.016 -.043 (.045) (. 054) (. 052) ( .047) ( .054) 
GUIDPS 3. 355 -2.205 -5.08 -3.667 (8.865) (10.268) ( 10. 1 07) (10.1308) 
ESP1 .993 -1.37 -3.484 -.075 1.073 
(3. 045) (3. 495) (3.47). (3. 607) (3.102) 
ESP2 
-.397 -2.786 .265 -1.541 -2.337 ( . 745) (3.438) (3. 64) (3.653) (3.128) 
.e 
L.JEt-i bo .571 1. 68 1.247 1.686 1. 561 
.e 
+ (1-b0)Nt-il 
.e 
L[Et-i . -.039 -.357 -.262 -.501 -.33 
(Dt)] 
TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
RH01 
-.419 -.2~6 -.02 .0?9 -.482* 
(.237) (.149) ( .173) (.294) ( .243) 
RH02 -.074 -.093 -. 111 -.092 -.078 
( .067) (.061)) (.067) ( .068) (. 069) 
RH03 .216* • 183* . 16R* .238* .209* 
( .067) ( . 061)) ( .068) (.069) ( .069) 
RH04 .012 . 124* . 14~* .06 .069 
(.06) (. 061) ( .061) (.061) (. 062) 
Adjusted R2 • 11)6 .16? • 16~ .448 .24B 
Standard Error 3.221 ~.9 1).093 2.479 3.707 
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TABLE XVlll (Continued) 
Variable PRIMa PRINTa RUBBER b STONE a TEXT a 
ITR -4.372 3.98~ . 193 1. f:>63 -.464 
(6.012) (4.697) (.442) (2.399) ( 1. 48) 
lUNEMRDI .191 -.04~ .698 -. 191 -.713 
(. 327) (.9')3) (.612) ( .414) (. 497) 
ICHSSTAX .14 
-.331 -.033 -. 1')3 .• 032 
(.273) (. 37?) ( .098) (.146) (.14')) 
CHMINWA .029 .023 -.019 .0003 .024 (.048) ( .046) ( . 0')4) ( .044~) (. <h4) 
GUIDPS 
-6.338 -2.79') -2.3')9 -2.818 
(9.83?) (8.77')) UL?33) ( 11. 681) 
ESP1 3.21~ -.362 -1.839 . 163 -1.621 (3.68?) (3. 19) (4.161) (3.114) (3. 81)6) 
ESP2 .198 -1.084 -.61)2 -1.764 2.00') 
(3. ?63) (3.05) (4.086) (3.318) (3. 9')1)) 
.e 
~ rEt-ibO 2.1)42 .742 1.079 1. 396" 1. 386 
.e 
+ (1-b0)Nt-il 
.e 
L[Et-i . -.558 .037 -. 1 ')7 -. 15 -. 188 
(Dt)l 
TABLE ~Till (Continued) 
RH01 .062 -.136 .084 -.2<)8 
(.248) ( • 4':>2) (.179) (. 306) 
RH02 
-.08 -.082 -. 11 -.077 
(.068) ( • 06R) (.071) (. 068) 
RH03 .22* .236* .22* .217* 
( .07) ( .07) (.072) (. 069) 
RH04 .063 .0~9 .061 .074 
(.062) ( .061) (.064) (.061) 
Adjusted R2 .525 .447 -.03":> .43 
Standard Error 3.422 1. 747 5.1:>39 2.719 
The dependent variable is IC. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level • 
. e .e .e 
ine variables [Et_.b0 + (1-b0)Nt_.l and rF.t-· (Dt)l are lagged 
from t to t-13. 1 1 1 
a bine sample period is 1967:1 through 1985:3. 
ine sample period is 1968:4 through 1985:3. 
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-.207 
(.146) 
-.09 
( .066) 
• 137* 
( .065) 
• 17* 
(.06) 
. 199 
5.958 
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in the manner described earlier in this chapter, using a smoothing 
parameter of 0.8 (light smoothing). Using the same procedure for 
converting annual data to quarterly data, but with a smoothing 
parameter of 0.~ (moderate smoothing) generated the results presented 
in Table XVIII. 
One apparent problem with the estimates of the coefficients of the 
variables in the wage equations presented in both Table XVII and Table 
XVIII is that the vast majority of the coefficients are not signifi-
cantly different from zero. In light of the aggregate results for the 
same hypothesis (presented in Chapter Ill), where none of the coef-
ficients, with the exception of some of the RHO coefficients, were 
significantly different from zero, and given the ad hoc nature in which 
some of the variables had to be created due to data problems at the 
industry level, the results presented in this chapter, with regard to 
the lack of statistical significance, are not surprising. 
Turning first to the results presented in Table XVII, we see that 
each industry's trend rate of productivity, ITR, had no effect on that 
industry's rate of wage inflation. 
Toe difference between an industry's unemployment rate and the 
economy's natural unemployment rate, IUNEMRDI, significantly affected 
the rate of wage inflation in just two industries: FOOD and TEXT 
(textiles), with the effects being in opposite directions' In the case 
of the FOOD industry, the coefficient implies that a one percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate in this industry raises the 
wage inflation rate by 1.955 percentage points; whereas, in the case of 
the TEXT industry, the coefficient implies that a one percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate in this industry lowers the wage 
inflation r~te by .Q~7 percentage points. 
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The third variable, lCHSSTAX, reflects the effects of changes in 
employment taxes on the wage inflation rate. FOOD is the only industry 
where the estimated coefficient for tr•is variable is significantly 
different from zero, and this estimated coefficient implies that a one 
percentage point increase in employment taxes reduces the wage 
inflation rate by .297 percent. 
The fourth variable, CHMINWA, reflects the effects of changes in 
the minimum wage on each industry's wage inflation rate. ine 
coefficient is significantly different from zero only for the APP 
(apparel) industry, with the coefficient indicating that a ten percent-
age point increase in the minimum wage increases the overall wage rate 
(including fringe benefits) by 1.~4 percentage points. 
ine fifth variable, GIJlDPS, represents the Kennedy-Johnson 
guideposts and is included in just thirteen of the fifteen industry 
wage inflation equations, being excluded from the equations for the 
PAPER and RUBBER industries. Tbe estimation period for the wage 
inflation equations for these two industries began in 1968:4, which was 
after the guideposts had ended. This estimation period was shorter 
than the estimation period for the other thirteen 2-digit industries, 
the difference in estimation periods being the result of the different 
time periods over which industry unemployment rates have been reported. 
The estimation period for the thirteen 2-digit industries that include 
the GUIDPS variable began in 1967:1. As a result, GUlDPS had a non-
zero value for just three quarters, the first three quarters of 1967. 
ine coefficient for GUlDPS was significantly different from zero only 
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for the CHEM (chemical) industry. tois coefficient is extraordinarily 
large, and indicates that the latter stages of toe guideposts caused a 
284 percent increase in wage inflation in this industry. 
Toe two variables ESP1 and ESP2 are dummy variables that divide 
the Nixon controls program approximately in half. Toe coefficients for 
ESP2, \o.hich represents the second half of the program (Phases III and 
lV) are not statistically significant for any of the fifteen 
industries, while one of the ESP1 coefficients is statistically 
.'Significant. The coefficient for ESP1 in the F'AB (fabricated metals) 
wage inflation equation indicates that the first half of the Nixon 
program (a period of mandatory controls) caused a 36 percent increase 
in wage inflation. 
.e .e 
Tne next variable, ~ rEt-i b0 + (1-b0 )Nt-i l, represents the 
weighted sum of expected energy and non-energy price inflation. This 
variable is modeled as a fourteen quarter (from t to t-13) polynomial 
distributed lag function with the far endpoint constrained to zero. 
The coefficients for these variables would be expected to be positive, 
which they are in fourteen of the fifteen industries for which wage 
inflation equations were estimated. 
Tne hypothesis being tested is whether the Carter standards 
prevented the energy price shock of 1979-80 from getting passed through 
.e 
to wage inflation. Tne coefficient of ~ fF.t-i 
of energy inflation interacted with a dummy variable representing the 
period of the energy price shock) is negative in ten of the fifteen 2-
digit industries wage inflation equations were estimated for. The size 
of the negative coefficients, in absolute terms, for eight of the 
ten industries where the coefficient is negative, is greater than 
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the relative importance of energy prices in the CPI (approximately q.6 
·percent) for the same time period. Tous, it appear~ that workers 
entirely swallowed the energy price explosion in eight of the fifteen 
industries, and in two other industries part of the energy price shock 
was not passed through to higher wages. Tnis conclusion supports the 
aggregate level finding that the Carter standards did prevent the 
roughly concurrent 1979-80 energy price shock from getting passed 
through to wages. 
Turning to the results presented in Table XVIII, it can be seen 
that there are very few difference0 between these estimated 
coefficients and the estimated coefficients in Table ~Til. One 
difference is that the coefficient for ITR is significantly different 
from zero for the CHEM (chemicals) industry when employee compensation 
and wages and salaries are moderately smoothed (Table ~/Ill); whereas, 
this coefficient was not significantly different from zero when light 
smoothing was used (Table XVII). On the other hand, the coefficient 
for IUNEMRDI for the TEXT industry went from statistically significant 
when light smoothing was used to statistically insignificant when 
moderate smoothing was used. Similarly, the coefficient for ICHSSTAX 
for the FOOD industry went from statistically significant when light 
smoothing was used to statistically insignificant when moderate smooth-
ing was used. Toe coefficient for CHMlNWA for the CHEM industry 
changes from statistically insignificant when light smoothing is used 
to statistically significant when moderate smoothing is used. There 
is no change in the statistical significance (or lack of) for the 
coefficients of GUIDPS, ESP1, or F.SP2. 
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.e 
Wnen light smoothing was used, the coefficient for ~[Et-ibO 
• (Dt)1 was negative in ten of the fifteen industry wage inflation 
equations when both light and moderate smoothing were used. ine only 
apparent difference is that, when light smoothing was used, eight of 
the ten negative coefficients were greater, in absolute terms, than the 
relative importance of energy prices in the CPT while this was the case 
for nine of the ten negative coefficients when moderate smoothing was 
used. Toe important point is that when moderate smoothing was used in 
place of light smoothing, it did not affect the earlier finding that 
the Carter standards did help prevent, to some degree, the roughly 
concurrent 1979-80 energy price shock from getting passed through to 
wages. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explored the question of whether the 
Carter standards prevented the roughly concurrent 1979-80 energy price 
shock from getting passed through to wages at the SlC 2-digit industry 
level. A modified version of the constrained wage equation used to 
test the same hypothesis at the aggregate level was developed for use 
at the industry level. Data for industry level variables that are 
comparable counterparts to aggregate level variables did not exist in 
some instances. As a result, some ad hoc methods had to be used in 
these situations to create industry level variables that were similar 
to their aggregate level counterparts. 
ine main finding in this chapter is that the Carter standards 
helped prevent, to some degree, the energy price increases of 1979-80 
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from getting passed through to wages in ten of the fifteen industries 
being studied. Thi~ oonolu~ion supports the main conclusion of the 
previous chapter; i.e., the Carter standards helped prevent the 
energy price shock of 1979-RO from getting passed through to wages at 
the aggregate level. 
ENDNOTES 
1The exponential smoothing method used is based on the recursive 
formula 
where Yt = smoothed series at time period t, 
Yt = the original series at time period t, 
w = the smoothing constant. 
Since the exponentially weighted moving average is not centered and the 
original series were growing over time, the smoothed series will 
underestimate the original series unless the original series is first 
detrended. Tne original series was detrended by assuming a linear 
trend and estimating the equation 
Yt = a + (b) (TIME) + Ut 
where a = the coefficient of the constant term 
b = the coefficient of the variable TIME 
TIME = 1 for the first quarter of the series, 
2 for the second quarter, and so on 
Ut = the residual at time period t. 
The estimated residuals from this regression, that is, 
Ut = yt -a -(b) (TIME), 
provide the detrended series. 
Exponential smoothing is then applied to this detrended series. 
Two alternative values of the smoothing parameter, w = O.R (light 
smoothing) and w = 0.5 (moderate smoothing), were used to Bmooth these 
detrended series. Finally we take the smoothed detrended series 
Tit and add the trend back in; i.e. , we compute y t = t\ + a + (b) TIME. 
For a discussion, see Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts, 2nd Edition, (New York: 
MCGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 484-487. 
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CHAPTER V 
~!JMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
In this chapter we Will review the empirical results of this 
study, focusing primarily on how the Carter standards affected wage 
inflation at both the aggregate and 2-digit ~IC industry levels. 
Recommendations for future research complete the chapter. 
The Effects of the Carter Standards 
at the Aggregate Level 
The previous studies of tne effects of the Carter standards on 
wage inflation were at the aggregate level. Of these, the Hagens and 
Russell study had been the most recent and sophisticated. Hagens and 
Russell tested four different hypotheses, which were that the Carter 
standards (1) brought wage demands into line with trend-productivity 
growth, (2) changed the inflation-unemployment trade-off, (i) deflated 
inflationary expectations, and (4) insulated the economy from energy-
price shocks. The wage inflation equations used by Hagens and Russell 
to test these hypotheses had three major shortcomings. The first 
shortcoming, which occurred in all the hypotheses listed above, 
involved the assumption that expectations are Keynesian in nature. 
These hypotheses could have been tested using a rational expectations 
approach. The second shortcoming, common to the first three hypo-
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theses, was a failure to interact dummy variables representing the 
Kennedy-Johnson guidelines and Nixon controls p~riods with variables 
that were interacted with the Carter standards dummy variables. The 
third shortcoming, relating to the final hypothesis, was an apparent 
misspecification of the wage equation. 
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Ynese problems were corrected in this study, and several of the 
results are in direct conflict with those of Hagens and Russell. To 
illustrate, the results presented in Chapter Ill imply that the Carter 
standards did not bring wage inflation into line with trend produc-
tivity growth, contrary to the results of Hagens and Russell. 
Similarly, the results presented in Chapter III regarding the 
Carter standards' changing the slope of the short-run Phillips curve 
are in direct conflict with those of Hagens and Russell, who concluded 
that the Carter standards had no effect on the inflation-unemployment 
trade-off. The results presented here, however, indicated that the 
standards caused a perverse impact on the short-run Phillips curve; 
i.e., because of the standards, an increase in the unemployment rate 
would cause an increase in the wage inflation rate instead of causing 
it to decrease. 
Turning to the hypothesis that the Carter standards deflated 
inflationary expectations, it was shown that these standards did indeed 
deflate inflationary expectations, resulting in a reduction in wase 
inflation. Tnis result was in agreement with the conclusion of Hagens 
and Russell. 
Finally, the hypothesis that the Carter standards prevented the 
energy price explosion of 1979-RO from getting built into wage demands 
was tested. Hagens and Russell found, and had claimed as their 
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principle conclusion, that the Carter program prevented the roughly 
concurrent 1979-80 energy price shock from getting passed through to 
wages. After correcting their apparent specification errors, and using 
a rational expectations approach in place of an adaptive expectations 
approach, it was concluded here that the Carter standards did prevent 
the energy price explosion from getting built into wage demands. 
Wnether the benefits of the Carter program outweighed the costs 
remains an open question. The first two results discussed above indi-
cate the standards imposed costs on the economy, while the last two 
results indicate the standards generated benefits for the economy. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be determined which were greater. Even if 
these benefits exceeded these costs, this would not constitute an 
endorsement of the Carter program, since the costs of administrative 
burden and market distortion must also be considered. 
The Effects of the Carter Standards 
at the Industry Level 
As noted above, none of the earlier studies dealing with the ef-
fects of the Carter standards on wage inflation examined these effects 
at the industry level. In this study, wage behavior was examined in 
fifteen 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries amenable to econometric 
modeling similar to that performed at the aggregate level. The avail-
ability of data was the limiting factor in determining the number of 
industries for which wage inflation equations could be estimated. 
Hagens and Russell's principal conclusion about the Carter 
standards was that they prevented the roughly concurrent 1979-RO energy 
price explosion from passing through to wages at the aggregate level. 
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The same methodology used at the aggregate level in this study was 
applied at the industry level to test the energy price shock hypo-
thesis. Due to the methods used to convert some annual data to 
quarterly data, two different wage equations were estimated for each of 
the fifteen manufacturing industries under examination. Two wage 
equations were estimated for each industry because two different 
smoothing constants were used in converting the annual data to 
quarterly data. Two smoothing constants were used to ascertain whether 
the results were sensitive to the method used to convert the data. The 
results concerning the hypothesis that the Carter standards prevented 
the 1979-80 energy price shock from getting passed-through to wages at 
the industry level varied little when one smoothing constant was 
substituted for the other. Regardless of the smoothing constant used, 
it was found that the Carter standards did help prevent the energy 
price explosion from getting passed-through to wages in ten of the 
fifteen industries, thus supporting the conclusion reached at the 
aggregate level. 
Recommendations 
The following are this researcher's recommendations: 
1. The hypotheses outlined in this paper were tested under the 
assumption that in recent years, the Carter standards were the only 
factor that changed the structure of the wage-price process. It is 
possible that other factors may have affected this structure. For 
example, casual observation indicates a worldwide reduction in the 
wage inflation rate during the 1979-80 energy price explosion period. 
Research needs to be conducted into the question of ~1ether some 
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fundamental structural change took place worldwide during this period, 
or if there was simply a common response worldwide to this inter-
national price shock. If there was a common response to this shock, to 
what degree was it due to the incomes policies put in place in the U.S. 
during this period? 
2. The accumulation of data at the industry level needs to be 
expanded and improved. The lack of appropriate data at the industry 
level proved to be the major obstacle in investigating the effects of 
the Carter standards at this level. For example, there are twenty 2-
digit SIC manufacturing industries (although one of these is miscella-
neous), but due to a lack of data, wage equations could be estimated 
for only fifteen of these industries. Similarly, wage equations could 
not be estimated for 2-digit industries in the agriculture, mining, 
construction, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, 
or services industries because of a lack of data. This is particularly 
disheartening since manufacturing's share of total employment in the 
United States today is only 19 percent. 
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